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Is State Trust Land Timber Management "Better" Than
Federal Timber Management? A Best Case Analysis'
Ion A. Souder, Sally K. Fairfax, Teresa A. Rice, and Lawrence 1. MacDonnell*
1. Introduction
The nation is replaying a familiar public lands drama that has come to
be known as a Sagebrush Rebellion.' The mid-1990s version of this "hearty
perennial" begins, as they all do, with western states' dismay at federal land
holdings. The current debate is, however, unusual in important respects. The
o This article is based in part on the "Report to the Washington State Board of Natural
Resources from the Independent Review Committee" prepared by the authors at the Natural
Resources Law Center, University of Colorado (June 22, 1995). The opinions stated in the
article are the authors' and do not represent the positions of the Natural Resources Law
Center, the Washington State Board of Natural Resources, or the Washington Department
of Natural Resources (DNR). We do appreciate the review of the manuscript by Messrs. Paul
Silver, Jerry Otto, Jim Smego and Joe Shramek of the WDNR.
*Associate Professor of Forest Policy and Economics, School of Forestry, College of
Ecosystem Science and Management, Northern Arizona University, Flagstaff, Ariz. Ph.D.:
M.S., University of California, Berkeley; B.S. Marlboro College, Vermont.
Professor of Natural Resources Policy, Administration and Law, College of
Environmental Design and College of Natural Resources, University of California, Berkeley.
Ph.D., M.S., Duke University; M.A., New York University; B.S., Hood College, Md.
Natural resources law and policy consultant, and adjunct professor, University of
Colorado School of Law and University of Denver School of Law. J.D. University of Colorado;
B.A., University of Northern Colorado.
Lawrence I. MacDonnell, P.C. and President, Stewardship Initiatives. J.D., University of
Denver College of Law; Ph.D. Mineral Economics, Colorado School of Mines.
1. A good place to start on all of this is NELSON, PRivATE RIGHTS AND PUBuC LANDS
(1995). For a starting point on the enormous literature on Sagebrush Rebellions past and
current, see also Limeric, A History of the Public Lands Debate, a paper presented at the
conference "Challenging Federal Ownership and Management," Natural Resources Law
Center, University of Colorado (Oct. 11-13, 1995); BRUBAKER, RETHINKING THE FEDERAL LANDS
(1984); Fairfax, Riding into a Different Sunset, 79 J. FORESTRY 516 (1979); CAWLEY, FEDERAL LAND,
WESTERN ANGER: THE SAGEBRUSH REBELLION AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLrricS (1993).
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most significant distinction between the present and all previous versions is
the ubiquitous, serious discussion of community participation in decision-
making about local and regional resources, particularly watersheds.2
This emphasis has led, in turn, to an unusual attempt to take seriously
the possibility that states could, in fact, play a role in the management of
what we have come to discuss as "federal"3 lands. The issue of whether the
states could "do better" is on the front burner, a frequent topic of
professional panels, public debate, and scholarly and popular articles.'
State trust lands have emerged from the shadows of the public lands
debate and have attracted unusual attention as part of this discussion about
state potential.' Unbeknownst to many, twenty-two western states manage
approximately 135 million acres of trust lands for the benefit of schools and
other public institutions. 6 These lands were granted by Congress to newly-
joining states during the accession process in order to support public
institutions such as common schools Having labored to analyze state trust
lands for many years without much company, we were pleased to observe
2. See, e.g., DEmmIs, COMMUNnY AND THE POLITICS OF PLACE (1990); see also RIcE, Federal Lands
and Watershed Based Management Approaches, a paper presented at the conference "Challenging
Federal Ownership and Management," Natural Resources Law Center, U. of Colo. (Oct. 11-13,
1995); NORTHERN LIGHTS, various volumes, especially Vol. 9, No. 4 (Winter 1994); Chronicle of
Community, A Publication of Northern LJghts Institutes, Vol. 1, No. 1, et seq. (starting Fall 1996). Given
the focus of this piece, we accentuate the community aspects of the debate. Others, particular
students of, and participants in, the Wise Use movement, would assert that what is unique
about the present undertaking is the presence of a "broadly based anti-environmental
movement." See Brick, Determined Opposition: The Wise Use Movement Challenges Environmentalism, 37
ENV'T 17 (Oct. 1995). To the extent that Wise Use is connected with opposition to the Federal
government, the two are not, of course, unrelated.
3. Nomenclature matters: referring to the "former public domain" as either "public
lands" or "federal lands" evinces a bit of side-taking in a century-long debate.
4. There have been dozens of meetings, most widely advertised, perhaps,
"Challenging Federal Ownership and Management," Natural Resodrces Law Center, U. of
Colo. (Oct. 11-13, 1995); but other include, for example, "Public Lands Symposium: Public
Lands in Nevada-New Concepts for the 21 st Century," Reno, NV (Sept. 16-17, 1996).
5. See SOUNDER & FAIRFAX, STATE TRUST LANDS: HISTORY, MANAGEMENT & SUSTAINABLE USE
(1996) [hereinafter STATE TRUST LANDsI. See also Egan, In Idaho, Wily Opponent Who Takes on Ranchers,
N. Y. 'IMES, July 21, 1995; Unranchers' Reach for West's State Lands, 26 HIGH COUNTRY NEws I (July 25,
1994); Platts, Environmental Group Bids on Salvage Sale, 14 PERc REPORTS 6 (March 1996).
6. Note that the number goes to about 155 million acres when the subsurface estate
is included. Discussed in STATE TRUST LANDS, supra note 5, at 47-53.
7. Discussed in STATE TRUsT LANDS, supra note 5, at ch. 1.
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that the topic is now so "chic" as to attract the attention of the General
Accounting Office (GAO).8
We recognize that GAO reports constitute a special kind of attention. 9
Nevertheless, we welcome the discussion. For far too long, public and
professional debate about public resources has proceeded as if the federal
multiple use model was the only available or viable approach. The GAO
analysis makes many important observations. It also misses or muddies a
number of important points regarding trust lands. For both of those reasons,
it is very much worth discussing.
The purpose of this paper is to debate with and embellish the GAO Report
by juxtaposing it with work we were privileged to undertake for the State of
Washington.'0 The GAO's conclusions provide a good starting point for in-depth
understanding of how state trust timberland management programs work. It is
appropriate to focus on Washington for comparative analysis in the timber
context because it is by far the largest, most complex and most successful state
level forest planning and management program in the nation.
Elsewhere we have argued that the "Washington Department of
Natural Resources (DNR) is widely regarded as the premier state land
management agency in the western U.S .... Its programs and practices set
the standard for public land management at both the state and federal
level."' The GAO Report presents four reasons why the Pacific Northwest
state programs look good, indeed better than their federal counterparts.2
We have much to learn by exploring their results.
8. United States General Accounting Office, Public Timber: Federal and State Programs Differ
Significantly in Pacific Northwest, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Resources, House of
Representatives, GAO/RECD-96-108 (1996) [hereinafter GAO Reportl. The GAO was requested to
compare federal and state timber management programs in the Pacific Northwest.
9. The General Accounting Office responds, it frequently appears, to loaded questions
from elected representatives seeking data to support a previously defined position. And, it
generally appears, that knowing whence cometh the butter for their bread, the GAO provides it.
The world, accordingly, little noted and will probably not long remember a recent GAO
response to questions from Hon. Don Young, Republican Congressman from Alaska and Chair
of the House of Representatives Committee on Resources. At present it appears that the GAO
is more likely to service Republican legislators while the Democrats draw necessary research
from the Congressional Budget Office, but this partisan alignment is not stable. Personal
Communication from Mark Rey, Professional Staff, Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources, United States Senate, 1996.
10. See Wash. State Bd. of Natural Resource Indep. Review Comm., Report to the
Washington State Board of Natural Resources from the Independent Review Committee (June 22, 1995) (on
file with the authors) Ihereinafter Board Reportl. Our discussion will focus on the timber
management issues contained in this report..
11. GAO Report, supra note 8, at 1.
12. Id.
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The paper will proceed in three main parts. The first will introduce and
discuss the GAO's findings. The second focuses on state trusts, in general, and
in 'Washington State in particular. The third delves more deeply in to the
Washington timber program, discussing the evolution of timber planning in
Washington, and two disputes that have recently engulfed the state's program.
The GAO Report, discussed in Part II, concludes that although federal
and state timberlands in Washington and Oregon are often adjacent and
appear to have similar characteristics, "significant differences" arise in three
principal areas: (1) the states' "legislative and regulatory guidance" is clear
and simple; (2) the states' timberlands are primarily roaded, second growth,
hence they are "less controversial" to manage; and (3) the states' timber
sales programs rely on receipts for their funding, thus providing them with
an incentive to control costs and increase revenues, while the federal
agencies rely on annual appropriations and thus make no connection
between receipts and expenditures."
These three factors are manifest in a fourth area of important
difference, a state planning process that is shorter, less complex and less
likely to invite appeals than the federal system. Moreover, the states sell
their timber differently than do the federal agencies. Unlike the United
States Forest Service, the states do not have annual timber sale targets. This
allows the states to offer timber sales so as to take advantage of changes in
timber prices. 4 The rest of Part 11 will engage the GAO Report, challenging,
amending and sUpplementing its findings.
Part III will provide background on the trust lands in general and the
Washington trust in particular. Both of those topics are treated in more
depth elsewhere. 5 We will focus on general principles of trust land
management: clarity, undivided loyalty, accountability, enforceability,
perpetuity and prudence. We will use a standard Washington case brought
by Skamania County to explore the facial difference between federal
multiple use and trust notions of undivided loyalty and prudence. We will
also draw attention to the constitutional status of the trust mandate. Unlike
the federal multiple use lands, the trust mandate is typically enshrined in
the state constitution. Hence, the issue is not merely legislative and
regulatory guidance, as the GAO Report indicates, but indeed legislative
violations of the trust are unconstitutional. Part Ill will end with an
exploration of the GAO's assertions about the sources of funding for
13. Seeid. at 1-2.
14. See id. at 6.
15. See STATE TRUST LANDs, supra note 5, passim; see also Broad Report, supra note 10, at ch.
1; I. R. Johnston, The Legal Framework for the Management of Washington's Forested Trust Lands: Limits
and Imperatives, Bogle and Gates, Seattle, Wash. (June 30, 1994) [hereinafter Bogle and Gates I.
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Washington management programs.'6 We will also note that the GAO paid
inadequate attention to how the money that the DNR produces on trust
lands is allocated to beneficiaries.
Part IV will delve. deeper into the details of the Washington timber
management program. First, we will explore the evolution and current status
of the state's timber program planning. Our goal is to demonstrate that the
planning processes on federal and state lands are in fact quite similar. We
must look elsewhere for differences in outcomes from federal and state
timber programs. Then we will trace the long and complex evolution of the
process in two disputes. The first dispute traces the notion of prudence in
recent litigation concerning the DNR's alleged over attention to lynx habitat
on the Loomis state forest which is presently experiencing a mountain pine
beetle epidemic. 7 The second dispute begins with a discussion of sustained
yield and then focuses on the complex controversy over "arrearages" that
engulfed the DNR in the mid-1990s.
The two cases point in opposite directions. The Loomis case
underscores differences between federal and state management regimes,
with particular emphasis on expectations and culture. 8 We will underscore
that although the case is deeply contested, there is no disagreement as to
expectations and goals. The issue is what constitutes prudence.
The discussion of the arrearages dispute starts with the observation that the
sustained yield and marketing strategies of the Washington state program are not,
upon close inspection, as different from the federal programs as the GAO Report
suggests. Both agencies have taken to their bosom the forestry profession's highly
questionable dogma conceming sustained yield. 9 Both the Forest Service, where
it is statutory, direction, and the Washington DNR, where it is Board policy, strive
to achieve an "even flow" of timber from their lands. We will argue that this ought
not be the case; the even flow approach to sustained yield is a per se trust
violation. As implemented, it gives the timber purchaser enormous advantages
over the trust in speculating in a changing timber market. Further, timber sale
procedures embedded in the arrearages dispute allow the buyer but not the trust
to take advantage of changes in the market. We conclude again that the program
16. See STATE TRUST LANDS, supra note 5, at 45-47, 85-86 for a fuller discussion of state
funding mechanisms generally. See also Souder, Economic Strategies for the Management of School
and Institutional Trust Lands: A Comparative Study of Ten Western States, Ph.D. dissertation, U. of
Calif., Berkeley 19-41, ch. 6 (1990).
17. See Okanogan County v. Belcher, No. 95-2-00867-9 (Wash Super. Ct. Chelan Co.
1996), discussed infra note 161 and accompanying text.
18. Id.
19. See Parry, Vaux, et al., Changing Conceptions of Sustained Yield Policy on the National
Forests, 81 1. FORESTRY 150 (1983). For a brief discussion of how sustained yield differs from
sustainable resource management, see Ion A. Souder, et al., Sustainable Resources Management
and State School Lands: The Quest for Guiding Principles, 34 NAT. RES. 1. 271 (Spring 1994).
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is a per se violation of the trust. We will leave the obvious companion question-
if it makes no sense for the trust, does it make any sense at all for the federal
government-to the myriad of our colleagues who have tried for decades to point
to the absurdities of the policy on federal lands.2"
The state, however, undeniably sells more timber more efficiently than the
federal government. This is, of course, not the only basis for evaluating renewable
resource management programs. But focusing on that will allow us to identify real
distinctions rather than the superficial ones discussed in the GAO Report.
In Part IV we will return to the question that the GAO began with: why
is it that the states are so much more effective in putting timber on the
market in a speedy and efficient fashion? We reach a tentative conclusion
that the distinctions the GAO observed are more likely to arise from the
constitutional status of the mandate and a culture that emphasizes benefit
for the beneficiary than they are to emerge from legislative guidance and
funding mechanisms. We are not as impressed with the DNR's planning as
the GAO-it seems to us to be similar in all its diverticulae and
inefficiencies to the much lamented federal program. We observe, however,
that when all .parties share a basic set of expectations, in this case the idea
that the goal of management is to make money for the beneficiary, the
process is less likely to flounder fatally. But we recognize that when groups
fight over increasingly scarce resources, no system works very well. The
advantages in simplicity are, however, obvious.
11. The GAO Report
The basic conclusion of the GAO analysis reflects the interests of
Representative Young who requested the report.2' The GAO found that the
state trust land managers were able to offer timber sales in a far shorter time
frame, with fewer appeals and at significantly less cost than their federal
counterparts.22 With these basic conclusions, we have relatively few
quibbles. When the GAO asked why this is so, the report, in our opinion,
stumbled. The GAO attributed this overall difference to the four factors,
summarized above, which merit some elaboration.
Three of the GAO's points are fairly straightforward. The GAO asserts
that the states' "legislative and regulatory guidance" is clear and simple,
directing managers to maximize revenues over the long term to benefit the
schools and counties within the states. This simplicity, and the connection
between timber sales and returns to the beneficiaries, leads counties to
20. See, e.g., O'Toole, paper presented at the conference "Challenging Federal
Ownership and Management," Natural Resources Law Center, U. of Colo. (Oct. 11-13, 1995).
21. See GAO Report, supra notes 8, 9.
22. See GAO Report, supra note 8, at 1-2.
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pressure the state to sell more timber.23 The state's clear, profit maximizing
mandate contrasts, according to the GAO, with the Forest Service situation: the
multiple use framework "requires that the national forest lands be managed to
produce the greatest 'net public benefit,' and to develop detailed management
plans for the national forests; regulate timber harvests to ensure the protection
of other resources; and allow the public to participate in the development,
review, and revision of forest plans." The Report notes that "many Forest Service
officials believe that this framework provides little guidance on how to balance
the forests' competing users or to ensure their sustainability."24 In addition, the
GAO concludes that federal decision making has become increasingly difficult
because of the need to "consider other statutory requirements, such as the
Endangered Species Act" (ESA).2
The GAO Report is similarly unalloyed regarding funding mechanisms,
stating at several points that the states' timber sales programs are funded
from receipts, and thus the trustee has arf incentive to control costs and
increase revenues. This compares, according to the GAO, with the federal
agencies' reliance on annual appropriations, and their corresponding failure
to make decisions based on connections between receipts and
expenditures.26 The state's funding source encourages state officials to
"actively market timber to increase revenues and to reduce timber-related
expenditures to control costs." The Report compares this situation
unfavorably with the Forest Service situation wherein the agency "is not
required to cover the costs of their timber sale programs with the associated
receipts."27 The federal agencies, in contrast to the states:
rely on annual appropriations. Because no clear linkage exists
between the receipts from timber sales and funding associated
with the programs, there is little incentive to control costs or
increase revenues. In addition, the performance measures for
the federal agencies are based on the volume of timber offered
for sale, not the actual amounts sold.28
Third, the GAO Report simply asserts that differences in the
timberlands that the agencies manage account for important programmatic
differences. State lands do not, for the most part, contain old growth forests
23. See id.
24. Board Report, supra note 10, at 5 (citing Resources Planning Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-
1614 (1974), as amended by National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1647 (1997)).
25. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544, cited in Forest Service: Issues Relating to Its Decision Making
Process, GAO/f-RCED 96-66 (Jan. 25, 1996).
26. GAO Report, supra note 8 at 1-2.
27. Id. at 7.
28. Id.
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because they have already been harvested. The state lands tend to be
second growth and are generally accessible due to extensive road systems.
The federal lands are unlike these state lands: they contain old growth,
designated wilderness areas and other special use areas, recreation areas,
and similar features. And, the Report asserts, because the federal old growth
forests provide habitat for endangered species, the federal agency "must
take additional steps to protect these remaining old-growth forest areas."29
All of those differences are, according to the GAO, reflected in the
differences between federal and state planning processes. "While the states
have developed shorter planning processes that satisfy their legal
requirements and get the job done quickly, the federal planning processes
are more lengthy and expensive."3 The federal government is, according to
the GAO, required to consider and develop management alternatives, while
the states merely come up with a plan.3 Furthermore, because the federal
government manages for many resources while the states are only trying to
produce timber, it is "difficult to get consensus" on federal lands.32 In
addition, to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and
the ESA,33 the Forest Service must spend more time and money on long- and
short-term planning. In spite of all that effort, the Forest Service's decisions
are still more likely to be challenged than those of the state trustee.
A major concem of the GAO is that the state planning process is shorter than
the Forest Service Process. The GAO concludes that this is not because the state
does not seek public input in planning. The states, however, have long-range plans
that remain in effect until major changes occur, and they are used as a basis for
planning individual timber sales. Similarly, states prepare wildlife surveys well in
advance of individual sale planning. As a result, they can prepare an individual
timber sale in about eighteen to twenty-four months.
This contrasts, according to the GAO, with Forest Service planning,
which for an individual sale can take three to eight years. In contrast to the
states, the Forest Service includes a wildlife assessment in each timber sale
process. Also, because the federal agencies are to manage for multiple uses,
"it is difficult to get a consensus on how to best manage forest lands and
individual sales to achieve a net public benefit."34 Complying with numerous
other laws and regulations further complicates the federal planning process."
29. Id.
30. Id. at8.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 9.
33. National Environmental Policy act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a; Endangered
Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544.
34. GAO Report, supra note 8, at 8-9.
35. See id.
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The GAO also notes that the states get through their process with far
smaller timber staff. The Report includes fiscal 1995 data on the number of state
and federal employees involved in timber management in the Pacific Northwest.
The GAO compares 2,552 federal employees in the two states with 322 state
staff in Washington and 219 state employees in Oregon," for a state total of 541.
At first blush, the impact is as likely intended. Reality, however, is both better
and worse than stated. In Table I below we have displayed the GAO's report data
on number of personnel with its data on number of acres managed by the states
and the federal agencies37 and the amount of timber sold by state and federal
agencies in those two states.8 Although the GAO did not report its data in a
format to facilitate this juxtaposition, we have been able to compare the
number of timber management personnel per acre on federal timber lands in
the region with the same category of personnel per acre on state timber lands. 9
Table I
Acns and suff for a ma rl.,nrn azencies in the Pa ific Nonhwest
Forest Acres
Agency No. of Timber Timber Sold per Forest Acres per Employee
U_.________ Peuonnel Sold Employce Maneed _
U.S. Forest Service FS and BLM FS and BLM
(WA and OR) 2.330 401 BBF 0.172BBF WAandOR WAandOR
U.S. Bureau of Land Combined Combined
Man gement (OR) 222 124 BBF 0.559 8BF 15,826,000 6.201
Washington
Department of Natura 322* 607 BBF 1.885 BBF 2,255.000 7,003
Resources
Oregon State Foresu
Division 219 118 BBF 0.539 BBF 875,000 3.995
0 The WDNR reports that this number includes only their timber sales staff only, and not any
administrative support reforestation or silvicultural management staff.
Source: Based on data assembled from the GAO Report, at 3, 4. 9. Data is for 1995.
BBR: Billion Board Feet
Because they manage so much more land than the BLM or the states,
the Forest Service data looks considerably less ridiculous when expressed as
a per person per acre comparison. Conversely, the agency looks even worse
than the GAO's original presentation suggests, when expressing the same
personnel data in relation to the amount of timber sold. Washington State
sells more than ten times as much timber per employee than does the
36. See id. at 29. There are 2,330 in the Forest Service and 222 in BLM in Oregon. The BLM in
Oregon manages the 0 & C lands, without question their most valuable timber resource, which is,
because of the 0 & C's history as a revested railroad grant, admixed in checker-board style with
Forest Service lands in Western Oregon. For a brief and excellent introduction see BUREAU OF Govr
RESEARCHANDSERV., SCH. OFCOMMUNrrYSERV. ANDUB. AFFAIRS, U. OFOR., THEO & C LANDs (1981).
37. GAO Report, supra note 8, at 3.
38. Id. at4.
39. These numbers should be used with some caution since the number of
employees may be counted differently among different agencies.
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Forest Service in the Pacific Northwest. It is important to note, however, that
the BLM sells slightly more timber per employee than the trust managers in
the State of Oregon. This suggests that the trust is not the sine qua non of
enhanced performance. We shall return to this discussion in Part IV, having
noted for now that the GAO's analysis is too simple to fully explore the
comparisons between federal and state trust land timber management.
Ill. The Trust in General and In Washington in Particular
A. What Is a Trust?
The first step in locating apparent causes for the wildly disparate results in
timber management is, we concur with the GAO, to begin with the mandate. The
trust mandate is radically different from the multiple use mandate. This section
will underscore those differences, focusing on Washington.
The General Land Ordinance of 1785 is probably most familiar as the
origin of the township and range system that divided the nation into little
postage stamps of 640 acres each in order to sell them.40 But that same statute
also established a program of granting land to support common schools. At or
near the time of statehood, Congress granted sections in each township-first
one section (Section 16) and ultimately four sections-to new states. In 1803,
Ohio became the first beneficiary of such a Congressional grant.4 The program
evolved for over a century-and-a-half and played an integral role in the westward
expansion and state making process until it ended, practically, in 1912 when
Arizona and New Mexico joined the union, and actually when Alaska joined in
1959.42 Hence the grants are among our nation's oldest public policies, and are
certainly the core of our oldest public resource policy.
Of the almost 322 million acres originally granted to the states for
school and other public institutions, 43 approximately 135 million acres of
surface and 152 million acres of mineral rights continue to be held in state
ownership. 44 The state school lands are not managed subject to the same
40. See JOHNSTON, ORDER UPON THE LAND: THE U.S. RECTANGULAR SURVEY AND THE
UPPER MISSISSIPPI COUNTY (1976).
41. For a full story on the original grant to Ohio, see Mansfield, Educational Land Policy
of the United States: Land Grants for Educational Purposes Within the State of Ohio, XXVIII BARNARD AM.
J. OF EDUC. 59 (1878).
42. For a fuller treatment see STATETRuST LANDS, supra note 5, at ch. I.
43. The best general source on grants to states is ORFIELD, LAND GRANTS TO THE STATES
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO MINNESOTA (1915). See also GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAw
DEVELOPMENT (1968).
44. Regarding data on the original grants, see Gates, supra note 43, at 805-06. Current
acreage data are based on the twenty-two states that contain the vast majority of the remaining
school and institutional trust lands. See WESTERN STATES LAND COMM'RS ASS'N, DIRECTORY (Annual).
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multiple use standard that currently directs federal resource management.
That standard generally exhorts federal land managers to achieve, on the
public lands, "the combination of uses that best meets the needs of.the
American people."45
The school land and related grants are emphatically not multiple use
lands. They are held "in trust" by the states. With the exception of Arizona
and New Mexico, wherein the trust was clearly established by Congress in
the states' enabling act, the trusts are established in state constitutions. We
will return repeatedly to this single, crucial observation. Contrary to the
suggestion of the GAO Report, the core of the trust does not turn on
"legislative and regulatory guidance." Although the state legislatures are
clearly authorized to make rules regarding the administration of the trust,
the basic commitment to trust principles is constitutional "guidance," which
cannot be altered by legislative action.
A trust is a fiduciary relationship, which means that the trustee holds
and manages property for the exclusive benefit of beneficiaries identified by
the settlor, or person who set up the trust.46 The best way to think about
state trust land is to keep in mind the kind of trust that a grandmother
(settlor) might establish to assure that her grandchildren (beneficiaries) will
have funds to go to college: A banker (trustee) is authorized to manage and
dispense the funds to the student, who is not free to blow it on a Harley
(breach of fiduciary relationship by the trustee).47
The key characteristic of a trust mandate, and one which readily
distinguishes state trust lands from federal lands, is clarity of the goal:
Manage the trust resources for the benefit of the beneficiary. The trustee
must exercise skill and diligence in making the trust productive for the
specified beneficiary.48 Thus, the primary duty of the trustee is to act with
undivided loyalty to the specified beneficiary.49 This is generally taken to
For those who would dismiss the state holdings as inconsequential, please recall the National
Park Service is responsible for about 85 million acres, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service for about
100 million acres and the U.S. Forest Service for about 180 million acres.
45. Multiple Use and Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531; National
Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1647; Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784.
46. See Fairfax, et al., The School Trust Lands: A Fresh Look at Conventional Wisdom, 22 ENVrL.
L. 797, 883-87 (1992). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUS'rs §§ 2-4 (1959).
47. It is frequently observed, in fact, that a trust is established precisely when the
settlor of grantor does not trust the beneficiary to manage prudently.
48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRusTs §§ 170-183 (1959).
49. Although the existence of a trust can be implied in the absence of a specific
statement or document, the normal route to establishing a trust involves a trust
"instrument." The instrument identifies the trustee and the beneficiary, and allows the
settlor to specify terms and conditions for implementation of the trust.
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mean that "any derived benefit from the school trust lands must be used in
support of schools and may not be used to support or subsidize other public
purposes. Any arrangement not ensuring full fair market value for the use
and/or sale of the school trust lands violates the trust obligation . ... " 0 The
very purpose of the grants was to "enable states to produce a fund with
which the states could support the public school system."'"
Some have argued that "without exception, the principal goal, the
overriding purpose, of the trust administrative agencies is to secure the highest
monetary return." 2 Reality, as usual, is a bit more complex. While it is true that
the trustee is required to make the trust productive for the benefit of the
specified beneficiary, that is not the trustee's only responsibility, thus the
"highest" monetary return need not always be secured. In fact, the trustee can
tolerate uncompensated use if it does not impose costs on the beneficiary."
Other trust duties are elaborated in ancient common law principles, state
statutes and case law. These additional principles can be summarized under the
headings of accountability, enforceability, perpetuity and prudence.
I. Accountability
Clarity of goals facilitates accountability. The trustee must hold trust
property separate from other property owned or managed by the trustee, and
must also deal with the beneficiary with fairness, openness and honesty.54 In order
to meet that standard, the trustee is specifically and comprehensively accountable
to the beneficiary. The trustee must keep property records, accounts of receipts
and disbursements, and must furnish this information to the beneficiary. 5 It is
difficult to overestimate the importance of this approach to record keeping, in
contrast, to that practiced by federal land management agencies.
50. Bassett, Utah's School Trust Lands: Dilemma in Land Use Management and the Possible
Effect of Utah's Trust Land Management Act, 1989 1. ENERGY LAW & POL'Y 202 (1989).
51. Id. at 211. Undivided loyalty does not mean that an investment of activity is
disallowed if it coincidentally benefits someone other than the beneficiary, but it does bar
programs that .impose costs or reduce benefits in order to achieve a collateral or general
benefit. See, e.g., Oklahoma Educ. Assoc. v. Nigh, 642 P. 2d 230 (Okla. 1982); County of
Skamania v. State, 685 P.2d 576 (Wash. 1984); Ervien v. United States, 251 U.S. 41 (1919).
52. Patric, Trust Land Administration in the Western States 7 (Jan. 1981).
53. Personal Communication from Richard Pederson, consultant to the state land
board of Colorado, notes that managers of private trusts routinely make charitable
donations when they have reason to believe that the status of the trust will be enhanced by
the good community relations that putatively accrue to such donations. Meeting of the
Western State Land Commissioners' Association, St. George, Utah (Winter 1992).
54. Id.; see also Fairfax, et al., Conventional Wisdom, supra note 46, at 853-55.
55. RESTATEMENT(SEcoND) OFTRusTs § 172, 173, 179.1-.2 (1959).
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2. Enforceability
Trust doctrine allows the beneficiary 6 to sue to enforce the terms of the
trust. Trust obligations are fully elaborated in common law, statutes and many
centuries of judicial experience in enforcing the trust doctrine." While a
manager, a judge, a local banker, or even a citizen might debate or be confused
by the circumlocutions or technicalities of a contemporary discussion of
ecosystem management, they are far less likely to be thrown off course by clear
trust principles.
3. Perpetuity
Preserving the productive capacity of the corpus of, or resources
belonging to, the trust is one of any trustee's fundamental obligations.
Ordinarily, beneficial trusts are not necessarily perpetual: A trust might be
liquidated, for example, at the instruction of the settlor, when a beneficiary
reaches a certain age or when the purposes for which the trust was
established are achieved. 8 The school land trusts' peculiar emphasis on
perpetuity derives from the existence of the permanent school fund which,
56. Or others with an identifiable interest. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 172. One
of the major distinctions observable in trust land litigation is the issue of standing. Most states
freely grant citizens the right to sue to protect the trust. The Arizona and New Mexico enabling
act states that "Nothing herein contained shall be taken as in limitation of the power of the
State or of any citizen thereof to enforce the provisions of this Act." New Mexico-Arizona
Enabling act § 28, as amended, ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557 (June 20, 1910), cited in Lassen v. Arizona
Highway Dep't, 385 U.S. 458, 472 app. to opinion (1967), rev'g State of Ariz. ex. rel Ariz. Highway
Dep't v. Lassen, 407 P.2d 747 (1965). Other states are spread out on a scale from less to more
restrictive. See Fairfax, et al., Conventional Wisdom, supra note 46, at n. 194 and accompanying text.
More recently, see Selkirk-Priest Basin Assoc. v. Idaho (Ist. Dist Idaho Bonner County) (No. CV-
92-0037 (Oct. 9, 1992)), Plaintiff's Brief in Opp'n. to Mot. for Summ. I. at 26-47.
57. Whereas rules of administrative review favor the administrator, through
presumptions of deference to agency expertise and similar, rules for review of the trustee do
not favor the trustee. See Fairfax, et al., Conventional Wisdom, supra note 46, at 847-50 for a
discussion of the difference between judicial review of administrator's discretion and judicial
review of the trustee's exercise of discretion. The case of a government trustee is made
complex by the fact that the agency frequently acts as both administrator and as trustee.
58. "If by the terms of the trust, the trust is to continue only until the expiration of a
certain period or until the happening of a certain event, the trust will be terminated upon
the expiration of the period of the happening of the event." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 334 (1959). The trust purposes can also be changed or the trust terminated if the purpose
for which the trust was established is no longer reasonable. Change in trust purposes can be
sought under the cy pres doctrine of charitable trusts. See Fairfax, et al., Conventional Wisdom,
supra note 46, at 875-77 and references therein.
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starting around 1850, became a ubiquitous feature of all new and revised
state constitutions. Language regarding the funds is frequently draconian,
noting that the "principle can never be diminished" or the legislature "shall
make good all losses." What this means is that undivided loyalty and
financial productivity are forever balanced against the need to protect the
productivity of the trust, and in this case, to do so in perpetuity.
4. Prudence
The trustee is supposed to manifest "prudence" in managing trust
resources to balance undivided loyalty and perpetuity. The trustee makes
many choices about the nature, intensity, timing and location of
development. The trustee is allowed to withhold resources from
development while planning, to hold resources off the market awaiting
higher prices, and to act to protect the trust's reputation in the community
and the political climate necessary to profitable operations. An ordinary
person serving at the request of friends of family as a trustee for a'minor
child will be held, by the courts, to a less onerous standard of care than a
professional funds manager or forester who has made claims of expertise in
areas relevant to the trust. Interpreting the trust principle of prudence is
complicated by the land trusts' emphatic commitment to perpetuity.
These five themes of (1) clarity and undivided loyalty, (2) accountability,
(3) enforceability, (4) perpetuity and (5) prudence, form the core of the trust
mandate. They are constitutional rather than statutory requirements. Each
state has defined the trust a little differently, and Washington has some
particularly interesting peculiarities to which we now turn.
B. State Trust Lands In the State of Washington
1. The Trust in Washington
Washington joined the Union when Congress was granting two
sections in each township for the support of common schools. The standard
pattern was followed: First Congress reserved and then granted the "school
sections." Congress reserved lands for the support of common school in the
1848 Organic Act creating the Oregon Territory and in the 1853 Organic Act
creating the Washington Territory.59 The 1889 "Omnibus" Enabling Act by
59. Both Oregon and Washington territories are relevant. Section 20 provided: "when
the lands in said Territory shall be surveyed under the direction of the Govemment of the
United States preparatory to bringing the same into market or otherwise disposing thereof,
sections numbered sixteen and thirty-six in each township in said Territory shall be, and the
same are hereby, reserved for the purpose of being applied to common school in said
Territory." For a discussion of dates of reservation that ultimately wound up in which state,
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which Washington, Montana, North Dakota and South Dakota joined the
union, granted the reserved sections 16 and 36 to the new states.60 As it had
in all new states,6 the Enabling Act promised five percent of the proceeds of
the sales of Federal public lands within the states, but specified that the
money go to a "permanent fund" the interest on which would be used to
help support the common schools. 2 In addition, Congress granted to the
new state of Washington fifty sections of land "for the purpose of erecting
public buildings at the capitol of said States for legislative, executive, and
judicial purposes, '63 and reaffirmed previous acts granting lands for
1purposes of a university."64 It also granted 90,000 acres for "the use and
support of agricultural colleges,"" 100,000 acres for "the establishment and
maintenance" of a scientific school; 100,000 acres for state normal schools;
another 100,000 acre-grant for public buildings at the state capitol; and
see Soderstrom & Fairfax, Federal Reserved Water Rights for State Trust Lands? (on file with
authors).
60. 25Stat. 681, § 10(Feb. 22, 1889).
61. Except California, which is peculiar in this as in most other things. See Gates,
supra note 43, at 301-04.
62. Supra, note 60, at § 13. Congress has amended the 1889 Enabling Act eight times at
the request of the four states to clarify, alter or expand upon its intentions with respect to lands
granted for educational purposes. The 1932 amendments allowed the sale of lands principally
valuable for grazing purposes for a $5 per acre as an exception to the general requirement that
such lands sell for at least $10 per acre. The amendments specifically authorized the exchange of
such lands for others "of equal value and as near as may be of equal area .... They authorized
leasing of the lands for mineral development for up to 20 years and for hydroelectric power for up
to 50 years. They also authorized the states to use lease rentals and other income not derived
from permanent sales of the lands for direct maintenance and support of school and institutions
instead of going into the permanent fund. In 1938, the term for agricultural and grazing leases was
extended to ten years. In 1948, the state legislatures were broadly authorized to set the terms and
conditions for mineral leases. The 1952 amendments authorized each of the states to pool its
revenues earned from mineral leasing and apportion the funds among the school and
institutions based on the original granted acreage. An amendment in 1962 specifically authorized
the State of Washington to use funds from the sale of the lands granted for chartable,
educational, penal, and reformatory institutions for the construction of such institutions. In 1967,
Congress authorized the states to use rentals on leased lands, proceeds from the sale of timber
and other crops, and other forms of income for the acquisition and construction of facilities as
well as for their maintenance and support.
63. Supra note 60, § 12.
64. Supra note 60, § 14. See also Thomas R. Waggener, The Federal Land Grant
Endowments: A Problem in Forest Resource Management, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, U. of
Wash. 72-77 (1966) hereinafter Waggenerl.
65. Supra note 60, § 16.
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200,000 acres for state charitable, educational, penal and reformatory
institutions.6
In return for these grants, the State of Washington, again like all new
joining states, waived all right and title to the remaining unappropriated
public lands lying within the boundaries of the state; and the state of
Washington agreed never to tax the federally owned lands within its
jurisdiction. This was done in the traditional "compact irrevocable without
the consent of the United States and the people" of the state, in Article XXVI
of the Washington State Constitution. These quid pro quo underscore that
the compact was a bargain."
Other provisions in the State Constitution6 provide "guidance" for the
state in locating, disposing of and managing the grants. Article XVI of the
State Constitution provides that:
JaIll the public lands granted to the state are held in trust for all the
people and none of such lands, nor any estate or interest therein,
shall ever be disposed of unless the full market value of the estate or
interest disposed of, to be ascertained in such manner as may be
provided by law, be paid or safely secured to the state .... 69
By the time Washington joined the Union, a familiar pattern for
dealing with land grants had emerged. Nevertheless, there is idiosyncratic
language in every accession.7" A most important Washington peculiarity is
the phrase "for all the people." The relationship between the goal of the
grants and the establishment of a trust "for all the people" continues to be
debated. It may have been to resolve the question of whether the proceeds
from the permanent school fund were to be distributed just to the benefit of
the schools within the county in which the lands were sold, or were to be
available statewide. Others have argued that it gives standing to sue to
vindicate trust principles to all the citizens of the state.' Still others have
suggested that the "all the people" phrase permits management of the trust
66. Supra note 60 § 17. This section specifically empowers the state legislature to
determine the manner in which these lands are to be "held, appropriated, and disposed of'
consistent with the purposes for which they were granted.
67. See Fairfax, et al., Conventional Wisdom, supra note 46 § 11.
68. For a brief review of the proceedings at the constitutional convention as they
relate to school lands see Wilfred 1. Airey, A History of the Constitution and Government of
Washington Tenitory, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, U. of Wash. (1945).
69. WASH. CONsT. art XVI, § I.
70. See Fairfax, et al., Conventional Wisdom, supra note 46, at 818.
71. See JAMEs R. JOHNSTON, THE LAGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF WASHINGTON'S
FORESTED TRusT LANDS: LiMnrs AND IMPERATnVES. See also Bogle and Gates, supra note 14, at 5 n. 4;
Fairfax, et al., Conventional Wisdom, supra note 46, at 850 n. 194.
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resources for a broader range of beneficiaries than the schools and other
institutions." This question will reemerge in the context of specific disputes
in Section Ill, below.
The Washington Constitution also provides details on the
management and disposition of the lands. Disposition of lands granted for
educational purposes must be at public auction to the highest bidder. The
value of the land is to be appraised by a board of appraisers, and the sale
price must be at least equal to the appraised value." Each sale of land can
include no more than 160 acres; lands within an incorporated city, within
two miles of an incorporated city, and with an appraised value of more than
$100 per acre must be platted into lots and blocks with not more than five
acres in a block and not more than one block may be sold as a parcel in each
sale.74 Article III of the Constitution, creating the executive department,
establishes the position of Commissioner of Public Lands." The duties of
the Commissioner are to be established by the legislature, and the
Commissioner is to be elected to a four-year term of office.76
2. The Trust Lands In Washington
The Washington DNR manages five million acres of public lands in
Washington.77 Of those, over 2.2 million acres originated as statehood grants.
That is, approximately 74 percent of the original grants remain in state
ownership.78 Another important Washington peculiarity 9 is the Forest Board
72. Discussed in Fairfax, et al., Conventional Wisdom, supra note 46, at 873-77.
73. SeeWASH. CONST. art. XVI, § 2.
74. See id. art. XVI, § 4.
75. Id. art. Ill, § 23.
76. Administrative arrangements for the 22 western states managing trust lands is
discussed in STATE TRUST LANDS, supra note 5, at ch. 2. The elected commissioner is not a
Washington peculiarity, but it is unusual. Only Texas, Washington, South Dakota, New
Mexico, and Arkansas elect their land commissioners.
77. Of this total, 2.1 million acres are aquatic lands and are not considered in this
discussion. The DNR actually has a number of important functions beyond managing trust
lands. The DNR manages tidelands, shorelands, harbor areas, and the beds of navigable water,
referred to as the aquatic lands. The DNR implements the Forest Practices Act regulating
timber harvesting and other forest practices on private and state lands. The DNR has
responsibility for forest fire protection on both state and private lands. Finally, DNR manages
certain state lands set aside as protected areas. See STATE TRusr LANDS, supra note 5, at 42-43 for
a discussion of the difference between free standing and integrated trust land management.
78. STATE TRusr LANDS, supra note 5, at 48. For a discussion of the shift in policy
disposing of the land to retaining it, see id. at 30-31, 90-99.
79. Which it shares with Oregon. See id. at 150-58.
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lands. The DNR manages 622,000 acres of forest lands obtained by the state
either by transfer or purchase, primarily from the counties. These lands are
generally presumed, with some meaningful inaccuracy, to be held in trust.
There are actually two categories of Forest Board lands. Forest Board
Purchase lands were acquired, beginning in the 1920s, by purchase, gift or
transfer from the counties. The state purchased cut over lands "chiefly
valuable for the purpose of developing and growing timber."8 The second
category is called Forest Board Transfer lands. The state legislature authorized
the State to take over lands held by the counties because of tax foreclosures
that could be "used as state forest land."" Both categories of Forest Board
lands are held in trust by the DNR, but they should be distinguished from the
federal granted lands because of the difference in their origins and the
differences in the purposes for which they are managed.
Forest Board lands are held, by statute, to "promote generally the
interests of reforestation."82 The Forest Board lands cannot be sold, although
timber and other products may be sold and the lands may be leased.83
Although the proceeds from Forest Board land transactions are distributed
to the counties in which the lands are located, the Board lands are not
intended to produce income for beneficiaries and the state is not under any
trust-like obligation to make them productive.84 Note also that the trustee's
obligations regarding the Board lands are defined in statute and thus can be
changed by the legislature. The trust surrounding the granted lands is, as
noted above, defined in the Washington Constitution.
3. Trust Administration in Washington
As was typical, the Enabling Act and the Constitution left enormous
details about the management of the granted lands to the state legislature.
Washington, like most other states, has gone through a number of different
institutional arrangements reflecting a number of different management
philosophies and priorities during the last century." The modern era began
in Washington in 1957, when the state made a number of crucial decisions
about trust land management and institutions.
80. WASH. REv. CODE § 76.12.030.
81. See id. § 76.12.030.
82. Id. § 76.12.020.
83. See id. § 76.12.120.
84. Proceeds from these transactions are to be used for their management (up to 25 percent
for transfer lands and 50 percent for land purchase lands) with the balance paid to the county in
which theyare located for distribution in the same manner as property taxes. Sesupra note 83.
85. For an interesting compilation of earlier laws see Stanley Huge Junes, The
Development of State Forest Land Administration in Washington Through Legislative Action, unpublished
Master of Forestry thesis, U. of Wash. (1954).
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The DNR was created to consolidate a number of functions related to
management of state lands and resources. The new DNR, in its first Biennial
Report announced a decision to "retain and manage state lands wherever
economically feasible, instead of selling them."' Also the DNR was finally
granted authority to exchange granted lands." The remodeled DNR consists
of a board of natural resources, an administrator, and a supervisor.' The
elected Commissioner of Public Lands called for in the Washington
Constitution is the administrator of the DNR.89
These changes and decisions concluded a long period of conflict and
debate about forested lands in the state.9° They also coincided closely with
the emergence of trust principles as controlling on granted lands in the
western United States. As we have discussed elsewhere,9' prior to the 1950s,
most states had approached the trust lands in ways strikingly similar to the
federal management of federal public lands. By that we mean that the
lessees dominated the policies, and for the most part, the beneficiaries were
a secondary consideration.
A series of lawsuits, beginning in 1957 in Nebraska,92 and peaking in
1966 with the Supreme Court's decision in Lassen v. Arizona,93 clearly
reiterated the trust notion as controlling on granted lands. Thereafter, a
series of institutional and cultural changes began in most western states
that gradually altered the expectations and priorities surrounding
management of the granted lands. For example, the Washington legislature
directed the Board of Natural Resources to establish policies to achieve
"maximum effective development and use" of trust lands and resources.94 In
another statutory provision, the legislature stated that the maximization of
economic return is "the prime objective" of trust land management.9
86. WASH. DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES FIRST BIENNIAL REPORT 34 (1956-58).
87. The Enabling Act had been amended by Congress in 1932, authorizing exchanges
of granted lands, but the Washington legislature had not acted on this change until 1957. This
authority has been the backbone of the State's effort to reposition its holding away from
environmentally sensitive lands and consolidate its holdings on highly productive timber sites.
88. See WASH. REv. CODE § 43.30.030.
89. WASH. CONsr. art III, §§ 1, 23.
90. See Jones, supra note 85, passim.
91. STATE TRUST LANDS, supra note 5, at 33-36.
92. See Ebke v. Board of Educ. Lands Funds, 47 N.W.2d 520 (Neb. 1957).
93. Lassen v. Arizona, 385 U.S. 458 (1967).
94. See WASH. REv. CODE § 43.30.150.
95. See WASH. REv. CODE § 79.01.095 (calling for periodic economic analysis of state
trust lands "where the nature of the trust makes maximization of the economic return to the
beneficiaries of income from state lands the prime objective").
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In keeping with the subsequent environmental era, however, the Washington
legislature has also directed that a "multiple use concept" be utilized in the
management of all state-owned lands where "such a concept is in the best interests
of the state and the general welfare of the citizens thereof, and is consistent with the
applicable trust provisions of the various lands involved.96 The Washington Supreme
Court has, in several important cases, including Skamania v. Washington, underscored
that the trust commitments are "real."97 Nevertheless, when combined with the "for
all the people" language of the Washington Constitution, the trustee's obligation to
maintain the long-term productive capacity of the trust, balancing these obligations
requires, as noted above, that the trustee evince considerable "prudence."9
Questions about the mandate came to a head in the early 1980s in a
dispute over whether the legislature could divert trust resources to provide for the
timber industry.9 9 Before turning to the issue of funding sources for management
that so enthralled the GAO, let us look at the resulting dominant case in
Washington trust law. The Skamania case will introduce the crucial concept of
prudence in the context of the trustee's diverse obligations and clarify the
importance of the constitutional status of the mandate. The dispute also
illustrates the standard method of enforcing the trust principles, highlighted the
importance of financial returns in trust management, and made unmistakable
comparisons between federal and state management of public resources.
As we shall see in the next section when we discuss the emergence of
forest planning in Washington, the 1970s were a defining period in
management of forested trust lands. In the Skamania case, the most important
facts had to do with a sharp rise and then a plunge in timber prices."
The close of the decade was accompanied by a rapid increase in timber
prices. Timber purchasers bid up sales from both federal and state lands,
basing their bids on the presumption that timber prices would continue to
increase. ' Shortly thereafter, the inevitable occurred. During 1981 and 1982
the market price for lumber dropped sharply. Timber purchasers were faced
with "working contracts" for which they had paid $300 to $800 per thousand
board feet (MBF) while the market value of the timber had fallen to about $175
per MBF. The purchasers appealed both to the state legislature and to
Congress, requesting that they be released from their contracts without
penalty. At the federal level, there is no interest group that has an identifiable
96. See WASH. REv. CODE § 79.68.010, discussed in Fairfax, et al., Conventional Wisdom, supra
note 46, at 904-07.
97. County of Skamania v. State, 102 Wash. 2d 127,685 P.2d 576 (1984).
98. See infra, Section IV.3, where we will juxtapose the older Skamania case,
emphasizing maximum returns, with the more recent Okanogan case involving management
of the Loomis Forest in part for lynx habitat.
99. See supra note 97.
100. Seeid.
101. Discussed in STATE TRusr LANDS, supra note 4, at 33-35, 106-166.
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stake in protecting timber receipts to the Federal treasury, and no established
expectation that the federal sales program will make a profit. Thus, Congress
complied, and the federal purchasers were allowed to default on their
contractual obligations at a small fraction of the normal penalty. 2
-The story unfolded quite differently regarding Washington's trust lands.
First, the trustee, the DNR, which manages the trust lands, objected
strenuously to passage of the relief bill. Their opposition was unsuccessful,
but the interests of the trust were defended heartily by the trustee. The timber
purchasers argued it was in the long-term interests of the trust to protect its
market--effectively saying that if all the purchasers went bankrupt, there
would be no one to purchase their timber. The legislature enacted the Forest
Products Recovery Act in 1982, '0' which authorized defaults and provided
means for extending the contracts under modified terms.
Thus far, the federal and state stories are quite similar. Washington took a
sharply different path, however, when one of the trust beneficiaries, Skamania
County, filed suit, arguing that the act violated the state's duty of undivided loyalty
to the trust beneficiaries. The Washington Supreme Court agreed, ruling that the
state as trustee has a duty of undivided loyalty and a duty to act prudently, which
duties were violated by placing the interests of the timber industry with respect to
its contracts over those of the trust beneficiaries.0 4 DNR negotiations with the 82
defaulting companies concluded in 1989 with settlements returning nearly 75
percent of the original contract value.'
05
For present purposes there are three key elements of the Skamania
decision. The first is the bald comparison between the outcome on federal land,
where there is no group or interest which attaches particular importance to the
financial returns on a sale, as opposed to the state, where there are beneficiaries
who care, sometimes enormously, about returns. The second major element is
the trust's constitutional status, manifest in the court's discussion of the
legislature's authority relative to trust lands. As we have noted, the Washington
Constitution left the legislature enormous discretion to make rules and set
standards regarding the management of the trust. Nevertheless, the court
distinguished the general authority of the legislature to act in the state interest
from its more limited authority to act with respect to trust lands.
Where the statute deals with state trust lands, however, the
permissible goals of the legislation are more limited. The federal
land grant trusts were created specifically to benefit certain named
beneficiaries . . . . Every court that has considered the issue has
102. See id. See also Federal Timber Contract Payment Modification Act, Pub. L. No. 98-
478, 98 Stat. 2213 (1984).
103. WASH. RE. CODE §§ 79.01.1331-.1339.
104. See supra note 97.
105. WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURcES ANNUAL REPORT 9 (1989).
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concluded that these are real, enforceable trusts that impose upon
the state the same fiduciary duties applicable to private trustees."6
The court made it clear that the state cannot use trust assets to pursue
other state goals. This duty requires the state to obtain full value for trust
assets that are transferred, and it prohibits the state from actions respecting
the trust assets that provide benefits to others (here the timber purchasers)
at the expense of the trust beneficiaries,' 7 no matter how laudable may be
the reasons for providing other benefits.
The third key element of the decision is the duty to manage trust assets
prudently.' 8 In this narrow discussion of prudence, the court held that it means
diligently pursuing contract claims. According to the court, releasing contract
claims unilaterally, without clear benefit for the trust beneficiaries, is not
prudent.' 9 The court noted that the timber industry argument was based on a
single report with limited data from a single economist. Relying on such skimpy
information to make a decision that would cost the trust approximately $90
million was not prudent." ' We will return in Section IV to a more detailed
discussion of prudence as it is discussed in the Loomis case.
4. Funds and Funding from the Trust Lands.
The GAO paid relatively little attention to either the notion of
prudence, or the enforceability of the mandate in the courts. It focused
instead on the economist's theory that the best way to direct administrative
behavior is to tie management activities to program income. A brief
overview will put the GAO's conclusions into perspective.
a. Where the Money Comes From
In Fiscal Year 1996, total income generated from the state trust lands
was $311 million, about 55 percent coming from the Federal granted lands
106. Skamania, supra note 97, at 579-80 (citations omitted).
107. See Skamania supra note 97, at 580 (finding that the statute creating the Forest
Board transfer lands "imposes upon the state similar fiduciary duties in Itheirl management
and administration").
108. See id. at 582-83.
109. Quite apart from the trust obligation, the Washington Constitution requires that
the state also receive fair market value for all state property sold. See supra Skamania note 97,
at 582-83.
110. See Skamania, supra note 97, at 588; STATE TRUST LANDs, supra note 5, at 160, and
accompanying notes. We noted there and we reiterate that we hope some day that
someone will take the time to approximate what the "timber buy out bill" cost the federal
government.
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and 45 percent from the Forest Board lands." Expenditures for
management of these lands totaled $60.6 million." 2 The vast majority of
receipts are from timber sales, 82 percent the case of the grant lands and 99
percent for the Forest Board lands." 3
b. Where the Money Goes
An important, yet often overlooked, aspect of management is the
process for disbursement to the beneficiaries. The standard pattern is that
rents and receipts from sale of renewable natural resources are distributed
directly to the beneficiary. Royalties on non-renewable resources and
receipts from land sales are typically deposited in a permanent fund, the
interest from which is disbursed to the beneficiaries. Washington's approach
is complicated both by the presence of the Forest Board lands, and by the
creation, in 1967, of the School Construction Fund.
Since 1967, Washington has not deposited timber or most lease
revenues in the permanent school fund. Instead, the receipts are distributed
directly for the construction and renovation of school facilities. This shift
was made because the interest from the permanent school fund was
considerably less than the annual revenues earned from the sale of timber.'"
Note that because this change in state policy was in fact a change in the
Enabling Act, the shift required the approval of Congress."5
It is also important to note that there are many more beneficiaries of
trust land management than the GAO deals with. Recall also that the trustee
is obligated to keep separate accounts for each trust. So, whereas common
school beneficiaries are not affected by shifts in the regional allocation of
management effort or policies in a particular area-they are averaged out
over the state-each beneficiary only draws from the funds which its own
lands produce. Therefore, their cash flow may in fact be affected in the same
way that the Forest Board counties are by a shifting geographic focus of
harvest or harvest calculations. Moreover, different beneficiaries may have
I 11. Person Communication from Bill Koss, Wash. Dep't of Natural Resources (June
1,1995).
112. Revenues are totals for the State Grant Lands and the Forest Board Lands.
Expenditures are totals from the Resource Management Cost Account (for the State Grant
Lands) and the Forest Development Account (for the Forest Board Lands). WASH. DEP'T OF
NATURAL RESOuRcES, ANNUAL REPORT 16, 17, 27-28 (1996).
113. Seeid. at17,28.
114. Elsewhere we have spoken at considerable length about the relationship
between earnings in the permanent fund and management decisions for renewable and
non-renewable resources. See STATETRusT LANDS, supra note 5, at chs. 3, 6-7.
115, For the relationship between Constitution and the Enabling Act provisions, see
STATE TRusT LANDs, supra note 5, at 26-33.
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different preferences regarding the flow of returns. Some have need for a
steady, predictable income over time. Others might prefer that the state
"play the market" and get higher returns when the market allows, recognizing
that there will be periods of reduced income as well. This preference
depends in large part on how the beneficiary derives the remainder-
typically the vast majority-of their funds. If the state legislature views the
trust income as a drop in the funding buck and provides the remaining
needed funds irrespective of what the trust earns in a year, then the
beneficiary is, again, indifferent to fluctuations in trust income. If shifts in
the trust income are not offset by legislative appropriations, however, the
beneficiary cares very much about the periodicity of the returns.
Regarding the Forest Board lands, there never has been a permanent
fund involved. After the state deducts a percentage for management costs,
6
including reforestation, the remainder is disbursed to the county in which
the land is located for distribution in the same manner as used in the
distribution of real property taxes. "7
The fact that the receipts return to the counties for timber harvested
within that county means that counties pay considerable attention to the
timing of harvests in their jurisdiction and the geographic basis for which
harvests are planned. School land distributions are not, in contrast, tied to
the area of origin, which means that school officials are indifferent to where
harvests are located. Hence, it makes sense that the counties should be
pressing for intensified management, but only on the lands in their county.
What happens in other jurisdictions affects beneficiaries of the federal
grants but not recipients of Forest Board land disbursements."'
c. Funding for Management
The GAO's main point regarding trust funds concerns the relationship
between receipts and expenditures as a way of encouraging the agency to
control costs and emphasize returns. We share their conclusion. We also
note, however, that the facts are not as simple as the GAO Report suggests.
116. Up to 25 percent for Forest Board transfer lands and up to 50 percent for Forest
Board purchase lands are placed in the Forest Development Account (FDA). Similar the
RCMA, the FDA monies are appropriated by the Legislature. WASH. DEP'T OF NATURAL
REsouRcEs, ANNUAL REPORT 27-79 (1996).
117. See id. In 1968 the Washington Attomey General issued an Opinion pointing out
that the counties, when they originally acquired the lands through tax sale, held title in trust
for state, county and other taxing districts entitled to tax revenues from the land. 1968 Ops.
Wash. Att'y Gen. 10.
118. See infra notes 175-186, and text accompanying, for a discussion of this in the
sustained yield context.
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For Forest Board lands, the funding situation is fairly straightforward: The
state created a Forest Development Fund for Forest Board lands in 1923.
For the granted lands, the situation is slightly more complex. In 1961,
the state legislature established the Resource Management Cost Account
(RMCA) as a dedicated fund for the management of the granted lands." ' The
RMCA dedicated a percentage of the gross receipts from the granted lands
(originally a maximum of 20 percent and increased to 25 percent in 1972) to
be used for "defraying the costs and expenses necessarily incurred in
managing and administering all of the trust lands.""'2 The availability of this
fund gives DNR somewhat greater independence in establishing long-range
management programs for the lands since the legislature is not being asked
to authorize a DNR budget out of general state revenues. The legislature,
however, still must appropriate funds from these accounts biennially.
By Board policy, when the RMCA fund balance holds more than twelve
months of anticipated operating expenses, the Board may disburse the
excess.' 2' This has occurred every year since 1977, resulting in more than
$165 million of "excess" or unused management funds being passed to the
trust beneficiaries in the past seventeen years.122
5. Summary
The GAO Report tells a simple story about why the states are more
efficient at managing timber. It focuses on alleged differences in legislative
guidance, funding mechanisms, timber type and planning requirements. We
have tried to point out that the trust mandate is more variegated in its
contributions to differences than the GAO observed, and have done so by
emphasizing the constitutional status of the trust and the notion of
prudence, as well as the role of the beneficiary in defending the trust. We
have also tried to intensify somewhat their discussion of sources of funding.
We now have sufficient background to pursue these issues in a detailed
examination of timber management on Washington State trust lands.
119. See WASH. REv. CODE § 79.64.010.
120. Id.
121. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 332.100.040. Since 1978 the balance has been
distributed in one of two ways. From 1978 to 1988 DNR would suspend accepting funds into
the RMCA until the balance reached the desired level. This occurred from 1978 through 1983
and early in 1988. From late 1988 to present, whenever the RMCA accumulated surplus
funds, the Board would disburse the funds to the appropriate fund or beneficiary.
122. Interview with and comments by Bill Koss, Wash. Dep't of Natural Resources
(May-June 1995). The Forest Board lands receive no portion of the RMCA distribution as
their management fees enter the Forest Development Account. The FDA has not had a
surplus income situation similar to the federally granted lands.
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IV. The Timber Management Program in Washington
The burden of the present section is twofold. First, we want to disagree
rather sharply with the GAO's conclusions about the state and federal
planning processes. The GAO has suggested, wrongly in our assessment,
that whereas the federal land planning is distorted and slowed by NEPA,
ESA and other multiple use considerations, state land use planning is not
similarly affected. It is easier to obtain consensus on state lands, the GAO
concludes, because they are only planning for fhe production of timber.'23
We will trace the evolution of forest planning in Washington into a current
dispute involving the Loomis forest to demonstrate that these lands are not
noticeably less controversial, nor is the process less complex. We conclude
that we will have to look elsewhere for an explanation of why the state
program runs so much better.
The other task of this section is to look closely at two key disputes
surrounding Washington DNR's management program. At a gross level, the
disputes should challenge the GAO's assertion that DNR timber programs
are not controversial, or challenged politically or in the courts. We shall look
first at timber salvage issues on the Loomis State Forest. Ironically, the GAO
singled out the State's management of the Loomis situation as exemplary,
especially when compared to the federal agencies' conflicted salvage
operations.'24 Subsequent events have put the GAO's glib sustained yield
and timber sales arrangements discussion to rest.'2' The case also provides a
much fuller look at the issues of prudence and perpetuity that are necessary
for understanding trust management generally, and particularly where it
actually differs from federal management. Second, we will look at a technical
but intense dispute about arrearages that engulfed the Land Commissioner
in the early to mid-1990s. This will enable us to.explore areas where the
federal and state management programs are similar-in their embrace of
sustained yield definitions and marketing mechanisms that are, we argue,
per se violations of the trust. This section will enable us to ask, in effect,
"Well, if the states are not more efficient for the reasons the GAO cited,
where should we look for meaningful differences?"
A. Evolution of the Forest Management Planning Process
If the GAO is correct in asserting that state lands are inherently less
controversial than federal lands, then we are home free. We understand why
the trust mandate appears to work more quickly and efficiently than the
123. See GAO Report, supra note 8, at 8-9.
124. Id. at8.
125. See Sounder & Fairfax, Arbitrary Administrators, Capricious Bureaucrats and Prudent
Trustees: Does It Matter in the Review of Timber Salvage Sales? 18 PUB. LAND & RES. L. REv. 165 (1997).
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federal programs. If, however, the same conflicts exist and the state handles
them better, we need to pursue the question of why that is so. An introduction
to the forest management planning process in Washington should accomplish
two things. First, it should challenge the GAO's assertion that the State's
planning process is simple and abbreviated because it is not afflicted by the
controversial elements that badger the federal agencies, for example, NEPA
requirements, ESA controversies, old growth conflicts, alternative generation
and multiple products, each of which leads to litigation and appeals on
federal lands. The GAO implies that these problems do not afflict the state.
The evolution of the planning process will demonstrate, to the contrary, that
precisely the same issues arise on state lands that shape federal
management. This should come as no surprise. It is the GAO's suggestion that
is counter-intuitive. The same interests that challenge the federal programs
are just as active and alert in challenging the state program.
Second, the discussion should give a further flavor to the importance
of two trust notions: prudence and clarity of mandate. Our discussion of the
planning process will first underscore the basic point that the same
controversies exist. Second, we will focus on clarity and prudence, two
notions that inhere in the trust and which, in the context of the
constitutional status of the mandate discussed above, we believe contribute
to the observed differences between federal and state planning and
management. It is not that the issues and conflicts do not occur, but that
the state is authorized and required to handle them better.
Forest management planning became a "process" and a major
preoccupation for state managers at about the same time and in response to
approximately the same issues as occurred on federal lands. This new era of
state trust land planning had its genesis in a dispute over harvesting timber
without an adequate environmental impact statement. 2 6 The Washington
Legislature enacted a State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA) in 197 1.27 The
DNR believed that state trust land timber sales were exempt from SEPA. In
fact, the DNR had been granted an exemption from the assessment
requirements of the state's "little NEPA." The issue was addressed and
resolved in litigation surrounding the "Classic U" timber sale from state
lands on Whidbey Island.'28 The sale of timber included clear cutting a 255
acre tract in July 1977, and proceeded without environmental review under
SEPA. The DNR's exemption to SEPA was challenged by environmental
organizations and overturned in Noel v. Cole.1
29
126. See Noel v. Cole, Mem. Op. No. 9806 (Wash. Super. Ct. Island Co. June 23, 1978),
Order Granting Summ. I. (lanuary 3, 1979).
127. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 43.21C.010 et seq. (West 1998); WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§
197-I 1-400 et seq.
128. See id.
129. Supra note 126.
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All timber sales were thus halted by the dispute until the DNR
completed an environmental analysis. The agency responded, in 1979, with
the first of a series of forest planning processes, the Forest Land
Management Program (FLMP), which yielded the first Forest Land
Management Plan, accompanied by a programmatic environmental impact
statement as required by SEPA. In October 1979, environmentalists again
filed suit, claiming the environmental analysis was inadequate.3 ' This set of
events set the DNR on the course of planning, planning documents, reports,
and replanning and revised documents summarized in Table 2.
Table 2
Chronology of Washington DNR Forest Planning Policies
1979 Forest Land Management Program (& Final EIS)
1982 1983-1992 Forest Land Management Program (FLMP)
1983 Final Forest Land Management Program. 1984-1993 (& Final EIS)
1986 Timber, Fish. and Wildlife Agreement
1987 State Forest Board Lands: Report to the Counties
1988 Strategic Plan for Forest Resource Management
1989 Commission on Old Growth Alternatives for Washington's Forested Trust Lands
1992 Final Forest Resource Management Plan, 1992-2002 (& Final EIS)
1996 Habitat Conservation Plan (& Final EIS)
This familiar scenario figured prominently in the next election of a state
land commissioner. The new Commissioner, Brian Boyle, was elected in 1980.
He promptly resolved the issues in the original "Classic U" suit, agreeing to
reduce the timber harvest by half,' and settled the challenge to the adequacy
of the environmental analysis by undertaking a new round of planning.
The new and improved 1983 FLMP defined forest management guidance
for a ten-year planning period.'32 The document set broad policy, concluding, "in
managing the Federal land grant trust the Department is to be primarily
concerned with generating income for trust beneficiaries but must manage by
following prudent practices and by taking precautions to preserve the trust
assets for future beneficiaries'. 33 Three broad management goals for state forest
lands were described: (1) conserve and enhance the natural resources of state
forest land; (2) provide financial support that balances the level and flow of
revenue to the trusts; and (3) provide social and economic benefits. 34 In 1986,
Commissioner Boyle precipitated the Timber, Fish and Wildlife (TFW) process
130. See 2.1 Million Acres of Trees v. Cole, No. 79-2-01135-2 (Wash. Super. Ct.
Thurston Co. 1979).
131. See WASH. DEP'TOF NATURAL RESouRcES, ANNuAL REPORT (1981), reprinted in TOTEM
2 (January/February 1982).
132. See id. at xii.
133. Id.
134. See WASH. DEP'T OF NATURAL REsOURcES, FINAL FOREsr LAND MANAGEMENT PROGRAM,
1984-1993 (1983).
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that resulted in an agreement to revise forest practice regulations for greater
environmental protection.
The GAO also asserted that one of the reasons that state lands were less
controversial to manage is because the state does not encounter controversies
regarding old growth. This is in part correct. The State of Washington does not,
in fact, manage an enormous amount of old growth. Of the nearly two million
forested acres managed by the DNR, less than 5 percent, or about 65,000 acres,
are old growth defined as more than 160 years old. 5 These older stands are
located primarily throughout the western Olympic Peninsula and are intermixed
with the Olympic National Forest. But to say that they are not controversial is
absurd. What is important to note, however, is the way in which the state
responded to the disputes that inevitably arose.
In 1988, Commissioner Boyle established the Commission on Old
Growth Alternatives for Washington's Forest Trust Lands. Old growth
concerns had been raised as part of the Timber, Fish and Wildlife discussion
but, rather than becoming a part of the 1986 agreement,, Commissioner
Boyle agreed to address old growth issues separately.'3 6 In 1989, this thirty-
three-member commission produced a consensus report recommending the
creation of an experimental forest on Olympic Peninsula trust lands with the
goal of producing acceptable timber harvests while retaining the ecological
values of old growth forests, deferring harvest for fifteen years on 15,000
acres of old growth forest to allow research into ways to extract timber while
preserving wildlife habitat, and purchasing up to 3,000 acres of trust lands
with unique natural features warranting permanent protection.'37 Although a
management plan was developed by a citizens committee in 1990, DNR
never officially adopted the plan. DNR then began its own planning process,
which is not yet complete.'38 One of the six goals of the program is to
maintain harvest levels. This goal has not been met as a result of the
subsequent listing of the spotted owl and marbled murrelet as endangered
species under the ESA.'39
135. See WASH. DEP'TOF NATURAL RESOURCES, INAL FORESr RESOURCE POUCY PLA, 1984-1993
(1983); FiNAL FOREsr RESOURCE POUCY PLAN, July 1992 at 17 Ihereinafter 1992 PoucY PLANI.
136. This decision was made because most of the old growth was on state trust
lands whereas the wildlife issues arose on intermixed state and private lands. Telephone
Interview with Art Steams, Assistant Manager for the Community and Landowner
Assistance Section, Resource Protection Division, Washington State DNR (May 24, 1995).
137. See WASH. DEPT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, ANNUAL REPORT 7 (1989).
138. See Okanogan Co v. Belcher, No. 95-2-00867-9 (Wash Super. Ct. Chelan County
1996) (hereinafter Okanoganl, Belcher briefing document at 35-36.
139. Interview with Jill Mackie, Pacific Lumber & Shipping Co.; Chair, Dept. of Natural
Resources Timber Purchasers Committee; and member, Olympic Experimental State Forest
Advisory Committee (April 1995); Telephone Interview with Art Stearns (May 24, 1995).
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Several other major policy documents emerged in the late 1980s. In
January 1988, the DNR produced a "Strategic Plan for Forest Resource
Management," described as a business plan for trust forest resources. 4 ' The
described "central" goal of the strategic plan is to "conserve and enhance the
natural resources of state forest lands while attaining the highest long-term
net income from these lands.''. These documents led to the adoption of the
second major ten-year plan for Washington's forests.
In 1992, the Board adopted the Forest Resource Plan ("Plan") governing
management of state forest land for the ten-year period 1992-2002.42 The major
changes in the 1992 plan were a "landscape" planning approach, and an
improved wildlife habitat policy. Also, there was a change in process followed
during the development of the FLMP that not only included broader
participation within the DNR, but also earlier public involvement.
The Plan's stated primary goal is to "conserve and enhance the natural
resources of state forest land while producing long-term, stable income from
these lands."'43 Among the "major" policy changes identified in the plan is
placing "more emphasis on protecting ecosystem diversity and providing
habitat for endangered and threatened wildlife and plants" and making
"additional efforts to analyze the effect of its activities of aquatic systems,
including watersheds, riparian areas and wetlands, and it will modify its
activities when necessary to protect these resources."'"
The Plan outlines several general management policies governing its
trust assets. In deciding whether to sell, exchange, or acquire granted lands,
the "Department will balance current economic returns and trust benefits with
future economic returns and trust benefits."'145 Exchanges of Forest Board
lands will be based on whether timber harvesting is impractical and whether
the lands can be replaced with productive forest lands. 4 Lands unavailable
for harvest are to be designated as "off-base" and are not to be used in
140. WASH. DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR FOREST RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT 3 (January 1988).
141. Id. at 27. During development of the FOREST LAND MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, the
DNR considered moving approval of. individual timber sales from the Board tot he
Commissioner. This idea was rejected following a determination that a broader review
process produces better decisions. The process was modified, however, so that sales are
now taken to the Board following advertising, rather than before, to expedite sale
processing. WASH. DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, 1983-1993 FOREST LAND MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM 9 (1982) ]hereinafter FLMPI; Telephone Interview with Art Steams (May 24, 1995).
142. 1992 POLICY PLAN, supra note 135, at 9.
143. Id. at 13.
144. Id. at 14.
145. Id. at 15.
146. Seeid. at 16.
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calculating the sustainable harvest. 41 State forest lands are to produce a
sustainable, even-flow harvest of timber, "subject to economic, environmental
and regulatory considerations."'48 Because of regulatory uncertainties about
the amount of timber that can be harvested, the Department did not calculate
a sustainable harvest level for the period 1992-2002.
The tone and direction of planning, its origins in a series of disputes and
law suits, and the repetitive and cycling nature of the process are all familiar.
It is noteworthy that the state can get it done more or less on time. But the
state planning process is not the wildly different process that the GAO
suggests exists on state lands. It was born in the same disputes that have
shaped federal planning and it responds to the same problems: old growth
preservation, wildlife habitat, watershed quality and environmental
protection. This becomes even clearer when the issue of endangered species,
which the GAO suggests does not exist on state lands, is added to the mix.
B. Forest Management Planning and the Endangered Species Act
Even before the spotted owl was listed as a threatened species in 1990, the
DNR had been involved in efforts to improve state lands management to address
environmental concerns. As discussed above, Commissioner Boyle addressed
both wildlife and old growth concerns in special public involvement oriented
planning programs in the mid-1980s. In 1990, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS) listed the Northern Spotted Owl as an endangered species.
Under section 9 of the ESA, listing of a species commences a
prohibition on the "taking" of the species."'9 Taking has been interpreted by
the FWS regulations and by the Supreme Court to include harm to the
species' habitat resulting in death or injury.' ° All lands, regardless of
ownership, are subject to the provisions of the Act. The FWS developed
guidelines for establishing protected owl sites on certain lands. Since first
developed, some of these guidelines have been withdrawn by the FWS, or
modified as a result of miscalculation of owl "circles." In addition to the
federal requirements, the listing triggered regulation under SEPA, the State
Environmental Policy Act. The SEPA requirements affect both state and
private lands within the state. A SEPA analysis is required on lands
comprising the most suitable 500 acres for nesting, breeding, and foraging
habitat surrounding a documented owl activity center. 5' The DNR
147. See id.
148. Id. at 17.
149. ESA, supra note 25, § 9, 16 U.S.C. § 1539.
150. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Or., 515 U.S.
687,690-91, 704-08 (1995).
151. See Okanogan, supra note 138, Belcher briefing document at 32, Owl briefing
documents; see also WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 223-08-260; Crown Pac., Ltd. v. DNR, FPAB No. 94-
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responded to the listing in several ways, as summarized in Table 3, infra.
First, the DNR established interim guidelines. DNR's Forest Practices
Division established procedures for the protection of the owl based on
regulating activities within a 2.2-mile radius of an identified nest site or
activity center on the Olympic Peninsula or a 1.8-mile radius in the rest of
the state (the Cascades). FWS guidelines required that at least 40 percent of
the suitable habitat for owls within these circles must be protected.'52
Table 3
Chronolom of DNR responses to ie Norhern Spoted Owl listins
1990 Nonhern spoted owl listed as threatened species by dhe U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS).
1990 FWS announces initial "take* and survey guidelines.
1991 DNK develops inial l.year survey for norlhern sponed owls.
1991 DNR asablished "ake risk aiteria
1991 DNR staffi considers Haitat Conservation Plan (HCP) idea.
1992 FWS revises survey guidelines, requiring 2.year surveys; DNR goes t 2-year survey.
1992 DNR revises definition of potential owl habitat. adding additional acreage to risk analysis.
.1992 DNR again investigates idea of HP as additional species listinp become likely.
1993 Commissioner initiates development of HCP.
1996 HP finalized ad approved by Board of Land Commissioners.
The Board approved a staff-developed risk assessment approach that
first categorized three types of habitat: Type A (old growth), Type B (mature
forest), and Type C (younger stands with some old growth/mature
components). It then created five risk categories: 1 (within an owl circle), 2
(Type A or B habitat less than five miles from any known center but not in a
circle), 3 (Type A or B habitat greater than five miles from any known center
or Type C less than five miles from any known center), 4.(Type C habitat
greater than five miles from any known center), and 5 (non-habitat). Risk
category 1 sales proceed only if an owl survey has been completed and an
evaluation shows more than 40 percent potential habitat remains within the
circle. Rick category 2 and 3 sales proceed only if no owls are found during a
survey. Risk category 4 and 5 sales can proceed without survey.
Since 1991, the DNR has postponed, halted or repurchased timber
sales because of the projected risk of taking. 3 Within one year, about $20
million of sold timber under contract had been repurchased by the DNR
because of spotted owl problems and the inability of purchasers to log."
4
Since the listing of the owl, the DNR has worked with the FWS to ensure that
33 (Forest Practice Appeals Board June 1995), appeal pending; Comments of Paul Silver,
Deputy Attomey General, Washington State Attorney General's Office (May 30, 1995).
152. See John. R. Edwards, Impact of Spotted Owls and the Department's Timber Sale Program,
Briefing for the Board of Natural Resources (Oct. 1, 1991).
153. See Okanogan, supra note 138, Belcher briefing document at 32-33. The U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service has modified its rules defining prohibited "taking" since the species was
initially listed.
154. See Board of Natural Resources, Minutes (Sept. 3, 1991).
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developed standards and procedures are consistent with federal guidelines
for avoiding a "take" of the species. Standards for identifying protected
"circles," or setting radii surrounding known owl sites, were developed.
Guidelines for surveying owl habitat and for suspending operations were
also developed by the DNR.
Spotted owl survey protocols were changed as "take" guidelines were
reviewed and revised by the FWS. In March 1992 the FWS issued revised
survey guidelines. One of the changes required the DNR to shift from one-
year surveys to two-year surveys, and made inadequate the existing one-year
surveys on most of the sales scheduled from March through September. This
decision to shift to a two-year survey for future and pending sales was made
to avoid possible exposure to liability as a result of the changed survey
protocols." 5 The shift caused a significant drop in timber sales that year. In
addition, the definition of potential owl habitat was also modified, resulting
in the need to conduct surveys in areas previously not within the definition.
Finally, in 1993, the marbled murrelet was listed, prompting additional
surveys to avoid takings of this species. The combined consequence was that
many sales that had been prepared for sale were delayed while DNR risk
analysis procedures were completed. From 1991 to 1994, sales figures
continued to reflect the impact of these procedures initiated in 1992. DNR's
response is an example of a decision for the long-term interest of the trust
over the short-term revenue production although, because timber prices rose
during this same period, revenue was not dramatically affected."6 The harvest
and sales levels in 1995 appear to be on the rise over the previous four years.
Most recently, the DNR initiated a Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP)
process under section 10 of the ESA as another response to the owl listing.
The DNR began reviewing this option in 1991. Staff reports were developed
and the DNR decided against the approach at that time. As the impact of the
listing on state timber lands became more apparent, the potential risk of
"taking" was increased and the DNR began spending more funds on surveys
and other risk assessment analyses. In 1992, the DNR staff again looked at
the HCP process when it was revealed that additional species would likely
be listed. In 1993, the Commissioner created a new section within DNR to
develop an HCP for 1.6 million acres of state trust lands affected by the
listing of the spotted owl.
This new DNR initiative was reported to the Board at its inception, and
the Board has been kept apprised of the planning process. The scope of the
planning process includes all state forest lands within the range of owl
habitat. Department of Natural Resources staff have developed strategies for
the plan and have, since August 1993, regularly reported to the Board on the
155. Conversations with DNR staff members (May-June 1995).
156. Interview with lack Hulsey, Chief, Forest Resources Division, WDNR (Mar. 22, 1995).
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progress of the plan. In the spring of 1995, the DNR presented a range of
conservation recommendations or alternatives to the Board." 7
Perhaps enough has been said to suggest that the GAO's assertions
are erroneous, and that the Washington timber management planning must
in fact respond to the same endangered species, old growth, and related
environmental issues as the federal planners. What is unique about the
state's planning process has, in fact, also already been suggested. It has less
to do with the particulars of the process, the opportunities for appeals, or
the requirements for this or that procedure than the GAO infers. At bottom,
the difference is that the trust managers know what they are planning to
achieve. Goals are not likely to be debated on state trust lands in the same
way that they are on federal lands. The Skamania case discussed supra has
illustrated the importance of the trust mandate in the face- of an effort to
divert trust resources to the timber industry. More recent disputes allow us
to explore differences and similarities in timber management to locate
meaningful differences in the timber programs.
C. Two Disputes-The Okanogan and "Arrearages"
I. The Okanogan case
1 5 8
The emerging shape the trust mandates with respect to timber
management is particularly fruitful for highlighting the key notion of
prudence that was only partially visible in the Skamania case. The structure
of the Okanogan case is significantly different from that in the previously
discussed Skamania litigation.159 In the current dispute, plaintiffs are
challenging not acts of the legislature but decisions of the trustee. Hence,
issues of constitutionality, presumptions that acts of a legislature are
constitutional, the role of the legislature, and the clarity of the trust
mandate, although important at some level, are not the focus of the case.
The dispute deals squarely with the central notion of prudence. That leads
very quickly, as we shall see, to issues of perpetuity.
In July 1995, Okanogan County and fourteen school districts sued the
DNR regarding planning and management on the Loomis State Forest,
located in North Central Washington and entirely made up of lands with the
Common Schools as beneficiaries. Basically they charge that the trustee has
violated its duty of undivided loyalty to the beneficiary, putting
157. Interview with John Calhoon, Habitat Conservation Planning Director, Wash.
Dep't of Natural Resources (Mar. 20, 1995); Interview with Bill Koss (May 30, 1995).
158. This case is discussed from the perspective of the trustee's requirement to be
prudent in Souder & Fairfax, Arbitrary Administrators, supra note 125 at 200 et seq.
159. See supra notes 99-110 and accompanying text.
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environmental interests ahead of the beneficiaries in managing the forest."6
The DNR has done this in the midst of a pine beetle epidemic that
petitioners charge is destroying the standing timber on the Loomis, and
creating an emergency that could lead to a catastrophic fire. This they do,
again according to petitioners, to over-comply with environmental
restrictions, most particularly the protection of endangered species such as
the lynx. The lynx is not in fact a listed species. However, environmental
groups are concerned that roading for timber sales will impact lynx habitat.
The Loomis State Forest is unique in the Washington DNR's portfolio
of trust timber lands. First, it is the largest state forest, which at 134,000
acres comprises about 5 percent of all lands managed by the DNR. Second,
its timber resources-principally lodgepole pine-have traditionally had so
little value that timber harvests had not been conducted. This situation
changed with the rise in timber prices in the early 1990s, which caused the
DNR to first start scheduling timber harvests there. Both environmental
groups and the Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife objected to
these sales. Then newly-elected Commissioner Boyle withdrew these sales
pending the recommendations of a citizen's review group for the goals and
objectives for the management of the Loomis State Forest. 6' The citizen's
group recommendations provided the framework for the draft Loomis State
Forest Landscape Plan and its accompanying EIS, released in March 1994.
About a week after the court reached its first opinion in the Okanogan case in
June 1996, the DNR published the final plan. 2
The plaintiffs described the DNR's planning process as a tactic that
simply demonstrates "that the DNR has chosen to favor the interests of its
environmental constituents over its legally mandated trust
responsibilities."'63 It therefore asked the court to:
require the DNR to undertake a commercially reasonable and
prudent program of harvest and salvage that will ... (1) preserve the
trust asset from further damage due to mountain pine beetle, (2)
160. See Okanogan, supra note 138, Memorandum in Support of Petitioners' Request
for Mandatory and Injunctive Relief at 9.
161. See Okanogan, supra note 138, Declaration of Roy Henderson, Northeast Region
Assistant Manager, Washington State Department of Natural Resources at 4.
162. See WASH. DEP'T OF NATuRAL RESOURcES, Natural Resources Board Adopts Long-Term
Plan for Managing Loomis State Forest (Press Release June 4, 1996).
163. Okanogan, supra note 138, Memorandum in Support of Petitioners' Request for
Mandatory and Injunctive Relief at 23-24. Petitioners asked for a mandatory injunction, a
writ of mandamus and a permanent injunction. The discussion focused not on the legal
requirements defining those forms of relief in Washington, which were obviously much
debated, but on the gist of the complaint focusing on prudence.
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recover as much value as possible for the trust beneficiaries, and (3)
reduce the risk of catastrophic fire in the Loomis Forest.'
Specifically, the petitioners requested a writ of mandamus ordering the
Department to comply with a state law that directs them to "determine if the
sale of the damaged timber is in the best interests of the trust for which the land
is held.' 65 The statute requires such determination be made within seven
months of the Department having identified the damage, and plaintiffs charged
that such determination was being arbitrarily and capriciously withheld."
Finally, plaintiffs request that the DNR be required to implement a plan for the
forest that had been devised by their expert witness."7 Plaintiffs argue, in sum,
that the Loomis is in crisis and that the state has no options: certain clearly
identifiable measures, all of which turn on intensified harvesting, constitute the
only available path to prevent catastrophe and meet the trustee's obligation of
undivided loyalty to the beneficiaries.
This is a very difficult argument to sustain. The plaintiff's case turns, at
bottom, on the assertion that managing the Loomis is a "no-brainer." The natural
processes on the forest proceed in uncomplicated and predictable stages, and the
only thing that the trustee can do, for the beneficiary and the long-term productivity
of the forest, is to harvest, harvest, and intensify the harvest.
The DNR responded to that textureless assertion with a discourse on
prudence." That, rather than the legal or empirical merits of the charges
and counter charges, is the focus of this analysis. Needless to say, the DNR
did not argue that they were not obligated to act with undivided loyalty to
the school trusts. The state's brief and accompanying declarations focus on
prudence as the necessary response to complexity: complexity in the forest
ecosystem and in achieving forest health; complexity in present and future
economic opportunities, and the trustee's obligation to set priorities in a
cost constrained management environment; complexity in the constantly
shifting social and legal environment that could further constrain
management options; and complexity doubled and redoubled in balancing
the needs and demands of today's beneficiaries against the obligation to
evince loyalty as well to future generations of beneficiaries.
Prudence is most obviously manifest in the Judgment of experienced
experts dealing with a complex biophysical system. Whereas the plaintiffs
described the Loomis ecosystem as a simple cycle of inevitable stages, the
DNR argued that neither the problems nor the solutions were clearly defined.
164. Okanogan, supra note 138, Decision at 9 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 79.01.795).
165. Id.
166. See Okanogan, supra note 138, Decision at 8-9.
167. See Okanogan, supra note 138, Memorandum in Support of Request for
Mandatory and Injunctive Relief at 2-3. They also asked, of course, for attorney's fees.
168. See infra notes 170, 171,173, 174, 176-182, and text accompanying.
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Responding to an intervenor's assertion that "the timber trust lands are
nothing more than tree farms,"'" the state emphasized the diverse fish, water,
wildlife, vegetation and historic and cultural resources that make up a healthy
forest. And they challenged the plaintiff's specific assertions regarding pest
outbreaks and fire hazards. One expert with thirty years experience in dealing
with pests and fires in the region analyzed the Loomis, the "risk of ignition,
current fuel conditions, and ...data available" and concluded that "in its
current condition, the Loomis is not likely to experience a catastrophic fire."'70
The state presented similar data concerning the control of pine beetle
infestations, eroding the plaintiff's unalloyed assertions that there was "only
one way out" of the dilemma. Finally, the state challenged the assumptions of
the petitioners' management plan, such as their assumption that annual per
acre growth is reasonably predicted to be 200 board feet per acre. "The
derivation of this amount is not explained," declared Walt Obermeyer,
manager of the Forest Inventory section. "A conservative way to measure the
productivity of the forest ... produces a growth [prediction] of only 84 board
feet per acre per year. '7
Because the plaintiffs were alleging that the trustee had abandoned
the beneficiary iyi favor of environmental priorities, one element of the
DNR's discussion of biological factors was to establish a prudential
justification for considering all the resources of the forests, not just the
timber. Petitioner, intervenor timber counties, stated the issue squarely:
So long as the laws are obeyed and no nuisance is created, it is no
concern of the Trustee whether ... their management preserves bio-
diversity or achieves other environmental goals. For example, if long-
term maximization of timber revenues consistent with the general
laws result in the total destruction of lynx habitat in the Loomis
Forest, then the lynx must go. They are not trust beneficiaries. 2
169. Okanogan, supra note 138, Trial Brief of the Timber Counties at 10.
170. Okanogan, supra note 138, Declaration of George Flanigan, Assistant Manager
for the Community and Landowner Assistance Section, Resource Protection Division,
Washington State DNR at 4-7. The declarant opined, moreover, that "improved access which
accompanies timber harvest due to road construction will exacerbate the risk." He
concluded, however, that the same improved access would also "assist suppression efforts
and result lin an overall reduction of catastrophic fire risk in the Loomis."
171. Okanogan, supra note 138, Declaration of Walt Obermeyer at 2 (emphasis in original).
172. Okanogan, supra note 138, Trial Brief of the Timber Counties at 10 (embracing
language in Skamania that suggests that the Forest Board lands are identical to the school and
other granted lands). Nevertheless, they are clearly not identical, because, as noted above, the
DNR is under no obligation to make the lands productive for the benefit of the counties, only to
share with the counties a percentage of whatever receipts are produced. See id. at 5.
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The state could not and, of course, did not argue that it had an
obligation to the lynx or to achieve any other biodiversity goal. The state
did, however, tie overall health of the forest ecosystem to long-term trust
productivity. Citing the Forest Resource Plan, they noted:
IlIt is important not to foreclose reasonably foreseeable future options
for support. One way DNR does this is by attempting to retain the
capacity of the forest to sustain its components and biological
relationships. The trustee's duty to make the trust property productive
is, in the case of land assets, related to biological productivity.
Because forest productivity has long been, and is still, the subject of
professional debate, it is prudent to protect the full range of resources
on state trust lands .... DNR has concluded that it is sometimes
necessary to forego maximum potential current income in order to
ensure the ability to produce income over the long term, DNR strives
to generate substantial revenue for the trusts by prudently managing
the trust assets in a manner that will preserve their ability to support
the trusts in perpetuity.'73
Thus, the state argued, it is not necessary for the lynx to be a
beneficiary. Protecting the lynx, water quality, and fish habitat are each
essential elements of maintaining forest health for two reasons. First, the
trustee would be imprudent to foreclose the possibility that water, fish and
wildlife would some day become marketable and valuable trust resources. 174
173. Okanogan, supra note 138, State Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Request for
Mandamus Writ at .23 (citing FOR= RESOURCE PLAN (FRP), Appendix A at 10-12, 16-19); see also
Okanogan, supra note 138, Declaration of Art Steams at 12. This conclusion is supported by a
recent Attomey General's Opinion (AGO) on the precise subject. 1996 Ops. Wash. Att'y Gen. 11.
'Though providing economic support to the beneficiaries remains the primary purpose of the
Department's responsibilities with regard to the federal grant lands, this purpose does not
exclude all other considerations so long as such considerations are consistent with protecting the
economic value and productivity of the federal grant land trusts." Id. at 49. The AGO also cites with
approval the recent findings of the Utah Supreme Court: 'To the extent that preservation of non-
economic values does not constitute a diversion of trust assets or resources, such an activity may
be prudently undertaken. To the extent that the protection of non-economic values is necessary
for maximizing the economic value of the property, such protection may be prudently undertaken.
When such preservation or protection results in a diversion of assets or loss of economic
opportunity, a breach of duty is indicated." Id. at 48 (citing National Parks and Conservation Ass'n
v. Board of State Lands, 869 Pd.2d 909,916 (Utah 1993)).
174. "For example, conifer boughs sales, pole sales, mushroom harvesting leases,
and small diameter timber sales serve as examples of current revenue sources which did not
appear feasible in the past. DNR previously recognized the value of native genetic material
and set aside 2,147 acres of gene pool reserves to ensure that native genetic material, well
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Second, forest health is essential to sustainable growth of trees, which
comprise the trust's corpus.
Long-term productivity is not, as we have discussed elsewhere,'
necessarily an element of trust management. A trust established to help a
grandchild pay for college may, for example, terminate after the beneficiary
graduates. The school lands trusts are peculiarly tied not simply to long-
term considerations but to perpetual productivity. This arises because of the
school grant's close relationship to the permanent school fund-both the
lands and the funds are a part of the trust. Hence, the productive capacity of
the trust must be perpetuated. This means that the trustee is not allowed to
prefer present beneficiaries over future beneficiaries, heightening the
emphasis on the trustee's obligations both to prevent wasting of the
resource and to not run it into the ground. This shifts the focus on current
income considerably. It also justifies extremely conservative management:
there are no effective guides to social, economic or biological conditions of
the future, nor do we have anything like a clear understanding of what the
long-term consequences of intense harvesting or alteration of forest systems
might be. Therefore, the trustee's efforts to protect and maintain a
functioning forest ecosystem system in the face of the long-term
commitments of the trust is arguably prudent.'76
A second element of the state's arguments concerning prudence centers
on economic factors. The trustee must evaluate the total portfolio of each
adapted to local conditions will be available to the trusts in the future. DNR attempts to
maintain the production capacity of trust assets." Okanogan, supra note 138, State
Respondent's Brief in Opposition at 29 (citing FRP, supra note 173, Appendix A at 18-19).
175. See Sounder, et al., Sustainable Resources Management and State School Lands: The Quest
for Guiding Principles, 34 NAT. RES. .217,279, passim (1994).
176. The plaintiff's argument is at best a hard one to make: the assertion that there is
"only one way" or a "sole solution" requires unanimity among experts from a variety of
disciplines which is not even present in the testimony of DNR witnesses. On matters
biological, it is extremely difficult to support an assertion that the natural world works in easily
predicted ways and that we are sufficiently knowledgeable to respond with equally obvious
* programs that will unquestionably have the desired result. See Fairfax & Huntsinger, The New
Western History: An Essay From the Woods (and Rangelands), 54 ARIz. 0. 191 (1997); Rogers, Adaptation
of Environmental Law to the Ecologists' Discovery of Disequilibria, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 887 (1994); Fairfax,
Dynamic Equilibrium and Judicial Review of Agency Decisions, in PROEEDINGS OF THE SIxTH BIENNIAL
WATERSHED MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE 147 (Oct. 23-25, 1996). 'The biology of forest ecosystems
is not a perfect science," asserted declarant Steams. 'There are potential risks to the trusts in
being more aggressive in the harvesting of timber to maximize value. There are potential risks
to the trusts in being more protective of wildlife habitat and other public resources. The
anticipated Loomis Plan is intended to strike a balance of risks at this point in time while
creating and maintaining a flexibility as more reliable biological information is available in the
future." Okanogan, supra note 138, Steams Declaration at 9-10.
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trust and determine where and when to make investments that will meet the
trustee's obligation to make money. Art Sterns, a manager in the DNR for 26
years, noted that constraints and opportunities confronting the trust are
diverse: some are "quantifiable and time-certain, but many of them are based
on judgments considering historical events and possible future economic,
policy, and social scenarios.""' As the Loomis State Forest "contains much of
the least productive trust forest land in the state in terms of timber growth
potential and return on investments, "Stearns pointed out, "the Loomis Forest
historically has not been a high priority for investment of limited trust
management funds."' 8 Thus, Stearns argued, "opportunity costs must be
considered. Funds invested for low-return or net-cost salvage operations in
the Loomis are funds that cannot. be invested elsewhere for perhaps greater
returns. Given the economic and biologic uncertainties discussed earlier,
there is no 'right' answer for the best level of salvage in the Loomis.'79None of this is particularly surprising. Economic factors obviously
require the trustee to balance risk and opportunity-to exercise prudence. The
state also made other arguments where the background principles are easily
recognized but the outcomes are more controversial. Their discussions of the
planning for the Loomis clearly evince a commitment to what might be called
"political prudence." The trustee is obligated, the state claimed, to proceed in
a way that will allow them to continue to operate. The state presented three
kinds of data to make this argument. First, they argued that political
conditions could, and in fact did, threaten the productivity of the trust.
Since the late 1980s, forest management in the Loomis State Forest
has been intensely scrutinized. Planned sales were protested by
other state agencies and interested parties. . . . The threat of
litigation was constant. In general, operations in the forest were
grinding down and frustrating everyone involved. This was greatly
hampering the DNR's ability to manage the forest for the benefit of
the trust with any predictability or degree of success.'80
Second, they argued that conservative management, careful planning,
and trust building among interested parties, any one of whom could toss a
"monkey wrench" into the works in the form of a protest or a lawsuit, was in
the best interests of the trust. The state argued that the reason their interim
sales program, that is, sales offered prior to the completion of the landscape
plan, was successful was due, "in no small part to the trust levels patiently
177. Okanogan, supra note 138 Steams Declaration at 2-3.
178. Id. at 5-7.
179. Okanogan, supra note 138, Stearns Declaration at 5-7; id. Declaration of Wes
Culp, DNR Regional Manager for the Northeast Region at 2-3.
180. Okanogan, supra note 138, Culp Declaration at 2.
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built and nurtured over the past couple of years. I think many of our critics
are being convinced that we are doing things methodically and
professionally."'8 ' Third, they argued that their trust building was working-
that the Loomis sales, although challenged and delayed by intense planning
and public involvement, was moving forward at slightly more than the level
proposed in plaintiffs' plan.'82
The state's assertions of "political prudence" are confused by a question of
whether the state can make laws that reduce income to the trust and, if so,. is the
trust bound by them. Plaintiffs appear confused by the Skamania decision in this
regard. The "real lesson of Skamania" timber counties assert, is that
the State as a sovereign may not enact laws that conflict with its
fiduciary duties as trustee of the timber trust lands. To the extent
of the conflict, any such law is invalid. That includes not only the
law struck down in Skamania but also laws governing management
of public lands if and to the extent those laws would cause the
Trustee to manage the timber trust lands for any purpose other
than the sole and exclusive benefit of schools and counties."83
This is simply incorrect. There is absolutely no basis for quibbling: the
trustee is required to do business in compliance with laws of general
applicability as is any other entity doing business in the state. Washington
counties have been particularly aggressive in asserting that both federal and
state laws that restrict the profitability of the trust are inapplicable to the
trust. And they lose every time.' 4 Noel v. Cole,'8' discussed supra, is
particularly relevant. Plaintiffs' complaint about the extent and duration of
the state's planning for the Loomis, and its request that the court simply
impose a preferred plan on the Department is based, as the court noted, on
the assumption that the DNR does not have to comply with the planning
and public involvement requirements of SEPA.'8
181. Okanogan, supra note 138, Declaration of Charles 1. Johnson, Highlands District
Manager, Northeast Region, DNR at 4.
182. See id.; see also Okanogan, supra note 138, State Respondents' Brief in Opposition to
Request for Mandamus at 2 ('The petitioners' motion seeks to portray the long-term planning
process in an evil light as responsible for a shutdown in the timber sales program of timber from
Loomis. In trust, the State's planning efforts have permitted, rather than hindered, the State to
move towards a successful interim short-term timber sales program for the Loomis....").
183. Okanogan, supra note 138, Trial Brief of the Timber Counties at18-19.
184. See Board of Natural Resources v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1993); Case v.
Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1945); Noel v. Cole, 655 P.2d 245 (Wash. 1982).
185. Noel v. Cole, supra note 126.
186. "Petitioner's expert, Fred. Ebel, believes the DNR's management of the Loomis
Forest since 1992 has not been prudent in dealing with the mountain pine beetle epidemic,
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The basic rule is that the trust must, as any other business entity,
comply with all state laws of general applicability. Federal rules that both
discriminate against the trust and undercut the trust's ability to serve the
beneficiary are also allowed when there is an overriding federal interest-as
in the case of the timber export ban.187 State rules that specifically direct the
trust to utilize trust resources to benefit interests other than the trust are
not allowed. That was the issue in Skamania, and the Washington Supreme
Court was emphatic.8
But the DNR is making, in addition, a slightly different point. How far can
the trustee go in complying with external requirements? Must they merely meet
the minimum standard? Can they over comply, doing more than is required to
protect watersheds, endangered species, or cultural resources? Can they hold
off or pull sales, as Commissioner Boyle did, in an effort to forestall criticism
and more draconian regulation? At a minimum, the DNR's actions are
vulnerable to challenge if they do not comply with their own Departmental
procedures and regulations. The resource plan adopted in 1992 said that the
DNR would do landscape plans that would comply with SEPA, and weigh all the
resources at risk, including water quality and state listed species.' 89 You would
be vulnerable to challenge, Deputy Stearns suggested, if you have not addressed
those issues because "you haven't done a landscape plan as the policy of the
Board of Natural Resources says you must do."'90
The DNR went further and argued that it was prudent in some cases to
exceed minimum standards, even though it imposed short-term costs on
trust. This was justified with two arguments: protecting resources and
investments, and maintaining future sources of income:
Riparian protection in excess of minimum standards provides
additional protection for trust resources such as soil and capital
improvements such as culverts and roads. Consistent with the
duty of a trust manager, DNR believes it is prudent to manage
state forest lands and forest resources so future sources of
income are not foregone by actions taken today.'9'
although he did not consider the possible constraints of the State Environmental Protection
Act in forming this opinion." Okanogan, supra note 138, Decision at 7.
187. See Okanogan, supra note 138, State Respondent's Brief at 7.
188. County of Skamania, supra note 97; see aso STATETRusr LANDS, supra note 5, at 160-62.
189. 1992 POLICY PLAN, supra note 135.
190. Okanogan, supra note 138, State Respondents Brief in Opposition to Request for
Mandamus Writ at 7 (citing Stearns Declaration at 131).
191. Okanogan, supra note 138, State Resps' Brief in Opposition to Request for
Mandamus Writ at 28.
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Finally, DNR asserted that it will undertake some actions that do not
produce profit for the trust simply to maintain working relations in the
community. "Strong emphasis was put on involvement of other state agencies
and interested parties in order to develop a level of trust that would allow
timber sale operations to successfully advance to more appropriate levels."92
One might ask, given all the flexibility that the notion of prudence
potentially introduces into trust management, given the DNR's emphasis on
public involvement, and SEPA's NEPA-like demands for plans, papers, and a
reviewable record, what becomes of the mandate to achieve maximum
returns for the beneficiary? How, given all this prudence, does the trust
mandate finally differ from the multiple use mandate of which the GAO
complained? The answer is simple. There is no getting around the need for
flexibility and judgment, whether it is called discretion or prudence, in
managing complex ecosystems. Multiple use and trust land managers alike
must consider complex political and biophysical systems. It is important to
note that only the trust land manager is obligated to consider opportunity
costs, and that the DNR, and not the federal government, operates in a cost-
constrained investment environment.
The major point, however, is that there are clear benchmarks for evaluating
the trustee's prudence. The clarity of the goal does not indemnify the trust manager
from public debate. At bottom, expectations are clear and all contenders
understand that the major goal is to produce returns for the beneficiaries.
2. The Arrearages Dispute: Settling and Achieving Harvest
Lands
The same issues that led to the evolution of the DNR's planning
process have been pivotal in the emergence of another difficult issue, a hot
conflict over arrearages. The term arises from sharp reductions in the cut on
state lands that occurred during the early 1990s. Historically, Washington
timber mills have received on average about 1.2 billion board feet (BBF) per
year from the federal government and 700 MBF from the state. With
problems in federal sales resulting from the National Forest Management
Act and the ESA court suits, federal timber sales have practically
disappeared from the market (about one year's worth of volume over six
years in the early 1990s). This caused the industry to focus more on state
sales (plus the fact that stumpage prices for domestic and export have
equalized; see below). When the state sold only 370 million board feet
(MMBF) in 1994, the timber industry was shocked. 93
192. Okanogan, supra note 138, Culp Declaration at 4.
193. Telephone interview with Jill Mackay (April 1995). Ms. Mackay's analysis is that the
beneficiaries were not aware of the downfall in sales because stumpage prices had doubled.
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The core of this dispute is to be found in sustained yield. Sustained
yield's historic origins derived from concern that forests were being
harvested faster than they were growing which would ultimately result in a
"timber famine." At its simplest, sustained yield harvests annually an
amount equal to the stand's annual physical growth (called its "increment").
For example, if tree or stand maturity is determined (by specific criterion or
criteria) to be eighty years, then each year one-eightieth of the stand (forest)
would be harvested. This system is most easily envisaged with even-aged
management regimes, where specific areas can be harvested (i.e., for an 800
acre unit with a rotation age of 80 years, 10 acres could be harvested each
year under this strategy). For uneven-aged (selective) forest management
strategies, the determination of harvest ages and amounts is more difficult.
Here, typically individual trees (or small groups) are harvested when they are
mature (economically, physically, grade, or some combination), but the
difficulty is to maintain adequate growing stock of young trees within tile
stands so that an equal volume of trees are available in the future.
Sustained yield systems in the United States were first established on
federal forest lands. The emphasis was twofold: protecting the biological
and physical integrity (by not harvesting at too rapid a rate) and by
providing flows of resources with the idea to stabilize traditionally "boom
and bust," "cut and run" industries and their associated communities.
Economists have never liked the concept of even harvest levels, and have
roundly criticized the Forest Service for its policies. Economists Want the
market to signal the demand for timber supplies. If timber sales are made on
an even basis, then the seller is restricted from placing stumpage on the
market when prices are high, and conversely continues to sell stumpage
when prices are low.
While "sustained yield units" had been established previously for
portions of the state forest lands, in the process of establishing the DNR,
the policy became official. In 1971, the legislature adopted the sustained
yield approach and defined it as "management of the forest to provide
harvesting on a continuing basis without major prolonged curtailment or
cessation of harvest. ''
94
DNR practices in reaching sustainable harvest levels and annual cuts have
shifted during the past twenty-five years. Sustainable harvest is described in the
FLMP as a "compromise between an economic schedule and a biological
schedule."'9' The policy was restated in the 1992 plan: "the [Dlepartment will
manage state forest lands to produce a sustainable, even-flow harvest of timber,
subject to economic, environmental and regulatory constraints." 96
194. WASH. REv. CODE §S 79.68.030.
195. FLMP supra note 141, at 42.
196. 1992 POLICY PLAN, supra note 135, at Policy No. 4.
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The overall planning period for sustainable harvests is 200 years,
broken down into targets for each decade. Ten-year harvest levels prior to
1970 were referred to as the "allowable cut." This term was replaced with
"sustainable harvest" to more accurately portray the way in which timber is
sold. Although not required by the statute, the DNR has for several years
followed a policy of approximate even-flow timber sales from year to year.
Prior to 1983, Board policy was to allow fluctuations of up to 50 percent from
year to year. Now there is a 25 percent ceiling on annual harvest level
fluctuations. Purchasers of the timber sales in general cut the timber in
years subsequent to the actual sale. "'97
The DNR calculates the amount of harvestable timber for three principal
time periods. Sustainable yield calculations cover a planning period of twenty
decades, with the decade as the basic planning period. This is a longer term
assessment of the "carrying capacity" based upon the level the lands can
biologically sustain. Within this overall assessment, fluctuations in timber sales
from decade to decade are acceptable absent a prolonged cessation or
curtailment.9 8 Calculations of sustainable yields factor in the necessary resource
management activities to support the harvest level, including planting, pre-
commercial thinning, and fertilization.'99
The long-term sustained yield affects the decadal levels and the
annual sales. Harvest levels are established for each planning decade. These
are defined as the volume of timber scheduled for sale from state-owned
lands as calculated by the DNR and approved by the Board.00 Within these
decadal plans, annual timber sale levels are determined, considering market
changes. As discussed above, changes in annual sales levels are now limited
to 25 percent of the average annual sale.2"' The annual timber sale level is
set about a year in advance. The Board reviews the DNR's calculations and
approves the annual sale level.
197. See FLMP, supra note 141, at 42; DNR Study Group, A Report on Management of Forest
Trust Lands in the State of Washington, Part A: General Report Section I (Dec. 1977). The DNR's
policy on sustained yield control groups has also shifted over the years. In 1967, sustainable
harvest calculations were based on one group, or all state lands combined. Taking all state
forest lands as a whole, the oldest timber was cut first. This practice was questioned when, in
1967, sales were concentrated on grant lands where the oldest stands existed. On other trust
lands, particularly in the western part of the state, sales were significantly lower. This caused a
dramatic shift in revenues to the various trust accounts associated with western Washington
state trust lands, and prompted a change in the DNR's practice.
198. See WASH. REv. CODE § 79.68.030.
199. See FLMP, supra note 141,at 42.
200. See WASH. REv. CODE § 79.68.035.
201. The annual fluctuations were changed from "up to 50 percent" to "up to 25
percent." See FLMP, supra note 141.
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Other factors may affect the average annual sales level. For example,
the average annual sales level for the period 1991-2001 was estimated by the
DNR to be 840 MMBF.0 2 This figure was subsequently adjusted downward to
reflect northern spotted owl and other harvest restrictions. An annual sales
level for this decade was never formally calculated by DNR nor adopted by
the Board due to an uncertain and unstable regulatory environment,
including the listing of the spotted owl, the Olympic Experimental Forest
harvest calculations, and anticipated changes to the Forest Practices Act."0 3
Figure I
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Wi th that brief discussion of sustained yield calculations behind us, it
is possible to understand the core of the timber industry's "shock" and the
arrearages dispute. The pattern in DNR sales since 1980 is shown in Figure
1. Sales levels dropped below sustained yield in the early 1980s as a result
of economic factors, and in the early 1990s as a result of environmental
factors. The amount of variation in both cases since 1992 exceed the policy
limits established in 1983 of plus or minus 25 percent discussed previously.
And while the DNR has offered timber for sale above sustained yield levels
(1986 to 1990) in an effort to make up past deficits, the percentage sold
above sustained yield levels has never matched the percentage deficits
cause by either economic or environmental factors. s "
202. See 1992 PoucY PLAN, supra note 135, at 18i See & WAsH. RE . CODE 43.30.390 (if
deacsions by entities other than the DNR cause a decrease in thesustainable harvest identfied inthe
1983 hMi the DNR should offeradditional timber sales from other state-managed lands).
203. Telephone Interview with Art Steams (May 22, 1995).
204. The 25 percent policy was adopted in 1983; figures were within this policy until 1992.
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Based on the 1992 Forest Resource Policy Plan, the DNR projected
sales of 550 MMBF in 1992, 650 MMBF in 1993, and 675 MMBF annually
during the period 1994 to 1996. Had the 1992 plan been followed, the DNR's
sales level would have ranged from 30 percent below ('92) to 14 percent
below ('94-'96) their previously determined sustained yield level.2 °5 Because
of uncertainties in potential harvest activities and ongoing inventories,
however, the 1992 Plan specifically stated that the DNR could not determine
sustainable harvest levels at that time, but expected that they would be
calculated in early 1993.
What happens when the annual cuts do not, at the end of a planning
decade, meet the ten-year model? A 1987 statute requires the DNR to
develop a plan to deal with existing and projected future arrearages .2 " The
DNR has not developed a plan since this law was adopted, although it did
prepare a 1986 report on how to deal with arrearages.
To understand the stumpage sales and arrearage issue requires
recognizing that purchasers are essentially speculating in the timber product
futures market. While the state calculates its sales at a sustained yield level
777 MMBF,207 purchasers are buying stumpage based on expectations of
future demand, alternative supply sources, and timber product prices.
What is the DNR's practice for a typical timber sale? Initially, the DNR,
very much like the Forest Service, will conduct a general examination of the
potential for a sale in an area and examine access, environmental and other
conditions associated with the particular area. A decision is made on
whether to proceed in light of these conditions. This is the preliminary risk
assessment. The area is then cruised, and run through the requirements of
the ForeSt Practices Act and SEPA. ,SEPA serves as a vehicle for public review
and input. The DNR then, with assistance from the attorney general's office,
develops a proposed contract. An internal policy check is conducted by DNR
staff and taken to the Commissioner. If it passes the internal check, the
proposed sale and appraisal, and possibly additional documentation, it is
taken to the Board for approval. State agencies such as Fish and Wildlife
may also get involved in making presentations to the Board if other resource
issues are raised by the proposed sale. Once the Board approves the timber
sale, it is taken to public auction.
How are timber prices established for each sale? Appraisals are
conducted by the DNR for each sale. Prior to 1990, the residual appraisal
value (value at mill less costs) was followed, a method roughly equivalent to
that used by the Forest Service. After evaluation by the DNR in 1990,
transaction evidence became the principal appraisal method. The DNR now
205. Assuming the sustained yield level is 785 MMBF per year. See FLMP, supra note
141: 1992 POLICY PLAN, supra note 135.
206. See WASH. REv. CODE § 79.68.045.
207. SeeFLMP, supranote 141,at44.
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looks at full market value which includes transaction evidence, prior sales,
grade, volume, and other factors, and uses a sealed bid auction process. A
1989 study by Guss & Associates recommended a lump-sum sales approach
(in contrast to a "scale" sales approach" to achieve closer to market value."'
This approach was implemented by the DNR following Board approval.
The way sales contracts are written, a purchaser generally has three
years before being required to harvest a particular sale. As a result,
purchasers, especially in today's supply-constricted market, will attempt to
buy contracts and maintain a backlog of purchased sales so that they will be
guaranteed the availability of stumpage to meet market demands.0 9 Figure
2, infra, shows the relationships for the past 35 years.
When the timber product market price goes below the price paid for a
specific sale, the purchaser will delay harvesting that particular sale until
either market conditions improve or the contract expires and harvest is
required. That does not mean, however, that the company is no longer
actively seeking stumpage to buy. The company is still seeking contracts, but
searches for stumpage that can be purchased, and economically harvested
and processed, at prevailing market rates (or if it has its own lands it may
harvest them). At any given time, a purchaser will have a portfolio of sales
with each sale having a different stumpage price, different logging costs, and
a different species and grade mix. Presumably, the company makes harvest
decisions optimally accounting for these considerations.
208. Leonard Guss Associates, Selling Timber or Conveying Cutting Rights from
State Trust Lands: Examining Alternative Means (1989) lhereinafter Guss Reportl.
209. Board of Natural Resources, Minutes at 26 (August 4, 1981). The expectation of
increasing prices for lumber in the late 1970s and early 1980s led one representative of a
timber association to state, that it is "significant to keep in mind that the purchaser of the
timber sales currently bids higher than he can actually afford to pay for the timber; expecting
a higher return when the timber is actually cut and sold." Statement of Carl Newport,
Mason, Bruce & Girard, Inc., representing the Western Forest Industries Association to the
Board of Natural Resources at their August 1981 meeting.
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Because the stumpage market works this way, purchasers would like
the DNR to annually supply stumpage on a relatively consistent basis
(called even-flow in the federal context). This provides the timber company
with a mix of higher- and lower-priced stumpage for their cutting portfolio,
as well as relatively consistent expectations of available supplies. Current
Washington la20 requires the Board establish a sustained yield level (by
policy calculated on a decadal basis from the "on base" suitable
timberlands); and, if within any given decade this amount of timber is not
sold,2' ' then the DNR is required to conduct an analysis to determine how to
sell this timber in a way that "provides the greatest return to the trusts
based upon economic conditions then existing and forecast, as well as
impacts on the environment of harvesting the additional timber." 2
For the reasons given above, however, just hecause the DNR sells a
relatively constant amount of timber annually does not mean that
purchasers harvest the same amount each year (see Figure 2). So two factors
are present: first, the "arrearage" in stumpage offered for sale by the DNR;
and second, the "arrearage" in harvesting by purchasers with existing
contracts that have not yet been cut. One way to look at this relationship is
210. ,See WASH. REV. CODE § 79.68.040.
211. This is the "arrearage" defined in the WASH. REv. CODE § 79.68.035(lI).
212. WASH. REV. CODE § 79.68.045. See also WASH. DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, REPORT
10 LEGisLAURE: TIBE SALE ARRERGE (1986) as an example of an equivalent analysis.
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to analyze past DNR sales and harvesting, starting with the run-up in stumpage
prices in the late 1970s through 1983. Events during this period resulted in
"arrearage" problems that culminated in the 1987 legislation requiring
reconciliation of sustained yield, calculations and stumpage sales.2 3
The arrearages controversy arises from the fact that two interpretations
of the timber sale arrearage issue are possible: industry's and statutory
construction. Industry contends that the DNR has roughly a 2 billion board
foot arrearage. However, based on the. state statute, a different
interpretation can be offered. 2 4 The statute defines the relevant terms as:
"Deficit" means the summation of the difference between the
department's annual planned sales program volume and the
actual timber volume sold.
"Default" means the volume of timber remaining when a contractor
fails to meet the terms of the sales contract on the completion date
of the contract or any extension thereof and timber returned to the
state under WASH. REV. CODE 79.01.1335.
"Arrearage" means the summation of the annual sustainable
harvest timber volume since July 1, 1979, less the sum of state
timber sales contract default volume and the state timber sales
volume deficit since July 1, 1979 (emphasis added).2 5 '
The difference in interpretation depends upon whether the default
sales volume is added to the deficit.. Thus, depending upon one's
interpretation, the calculation of arrearage becomes either:
A. Arrearage = e (Sustained Yield - Annual Sales + Default) for all
years since FY '80.
B. Arrearage = a (Sustained Yield - Annual Sales - Default) for all
years since FY '80.
Figure 3 (A and B) shows the results of these two differences, with the
industry perspective (A) in the top portion of the figure and an
interpretation of the statutory construction (B) in the bottom portion.
213. See WASH. REV. CODE § 79.68.045, enacted in Laws 1987, ch. 159, § 4.
214. Id.
215. Id.
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The legislature dealt with the arrearage issues subsequent to Skamania when
it passed Chapter 159 Section 2, Laws 1987. This statute defines the terms above
and, if an arrearage exists at the end of a planned decade, requires the DNR to
conduct an analysis of alternatives to provide the greatest return to the trusts
while minimizing the impact on the environment.?' 6
While language in the legislative findings appears to allow the DNR to
sell the 1. 1 billion board feet of timber defaulted above the sustained yield
level between 1984 and 1993, and the DNR prepared a report on how they
planned to do so, the DNR is not expressly required to sell this timber,
216. See WASH. REv. CODE § 79.68.045.
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especially if environmental impacts cannot be mitigated.2 7 The DNR,
however, is required to prepare an analysis if arrearage exists in any given
planning decade. Without the default sales volume, and without a sustained
yield harvest level set for 1993 and subsequent years, the aggregate decadal
deficit (1984-1992) is calculated to be only 1 MMBF. Adding the deficit for
1993, assuming a 785 MMBF sustained yield level (which is not assumed by
the 1992 Forest Plan) gives a decadal arrearage of 251 MMBF, roughly one-
tenth of what the timber industry contends exists.
Two different reasons caused arrearage. first, timber purchasers defaulted
on their contracts over the period from 1981 to 1986 in the aggregate amount of
1.235 billion board feet. These defaults occurred at the same time that DNR
sales levels dropped 670 million board feet ('81-'85) due to lack of purchasers,
which combined resulted in a cumulative sales deficit of 1.938 billion board feet
under sustained yield levels. Even while defaulting on existing high-price
contracts, however, purchasers (in aggregate) were buying replacement
stumpage. This can be seen by the pattern of defaults in relation to DNR sales
arrearage. The DNR's sale arrearage existed basically for only three years, from
1981 to 1983. In 1984, in fact, the DNR sold slightly above the sustained yield
level, dipping slightly below the next year. In contrast, defaults on existing sold
stumpage began slowly in 1981 and 1982, reached their peak in 1983 (583
MMBF), remained high for 1984, and did not disappear until 1987, two years
after the Skamania'suit put an end to contract buyouts.
Until 1990, the DNR attempted to reconcile the previous arrearage by
selling above the sustained yield level. From 1985 to 1990 the DNR sold at or
above the sustained yield level, a cumulative makeup of 428 MMBF. This met
about half of the stumpage previously unsold due to lack of sales in 1981 to
1983, but did nothing to settle the defaulted sales' deficit. In contrast, the sale
arrearage situation in the 1990s resulted primarily from deferring stumpage
sales to reconcile environmental protection. In the early period, 1991 to 1993,
the level of sale was approximately 500 to 600 MMBF instead of 770 MMBF. This
temporarily changed in 1994 when only about 350 MMBF was sold.
3. Timber Supply from State Trust Lands
The supply of timber from state trust lands will be considered in light of
the following topics: long-term sustained yield (LTSY), desires of purchasers for
an even-flow of logs from trust lands, and past recommendations to the DNR
and Board regarding timber sale levels. These topics will be considered in the
general context of when, and how, to sell stumpage.28
217. See id.
218. This analysis will use the Waggener dissertation, supra note 59, and WALTER
MEAD, COMPETMON AND OLIGOPSONY IN THE DOUGLAS FIR TIMBER PRODUCr INDUSrRY (1966) as
starting points. Sale levels, particularly deficits from long-term sustained yield, were covered
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A useful starting point in analyzing these issues is to distinguish between (a)
the concept of sustained yield in the long-term, and (b) the even-flow of timber sales
(or harvests) volume on an annual basis. As Figure I and the accompanying
discussion demonstrated, economic and environmental constraints commonly lead
to considerable variation from the DNR's calculated sustained yield sales level. The
question of whether an even-flow timber sales strategy is the best policy for the
beneficiaries was discussed in the 1992 Forest Resources Plan, and its ramifications
were looked at in greater detail in the 1989 "Guss Report.,,2'9 The Forest Resources
Plan explicitly states the DNR has adopted an even-flow policy.20 The Guss Report
set out an alternative strategy that identified procedures that would allow the DNR
to utilize market signals to determine when to sell stumpage.
Price-responsive harvesting, compared to rigid sustained yield
harvesting, produced considerably higher income, not only from
stumpage sales, but from interest compounded on the higher
income. Net present worth is thus greatly increased. . . . IT]imber
volume cut under sustained yield for old growth forests could be less
than under flexible price responsive forestry, if and as over-mature
timber that would otherwise be cut is set aside to wait its turn.2
Figure 4
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in the DNR'S REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE: TIMBER SALE ARREARAGE, supra note 201, as required by
H.C.R. 29. From a portfolio management perspective, the Guss Report to the DNR provides
recommendations respecting the efficacy of sustained yield strategies in light of trust
responsibilities. Supra note 208. Similarly, ZINKHAN, FT. AL., TIMBERLAND INVESTMENTS: A
PORTFOLIO PERSPECn1VE (1992) provides supporting analysis.
219. Guss Report, supra note 208.
220. 1992 POuCY PLAN, supra note 135, at 17, 20-21.
221. Guss Report, supra note 208, at 68.
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Figure 4 shows, in simple terms, the relationship between the average
price received for DNR stumpage (the dark black line), and the amount of
stumpage sold (not including contract defaults). The market for DNR-stumpage
in the early 1980s demonstrates the relationship between demand and price. As
prices dropped, DNR stumpage demand dropped. However the situation in the
mid-1980s shows that the DNR placed large volumes of stumpage on the market
prior to price recovery beginning in 1988. Then once prices continued to
increase, the DNR's sales levels initially stabilized, then precipitously dropped
beginning in 1991 as prices remained firm and then increased. It goes without
saying that outside concerns, specifically the northern spotted own listing,
resulted in much of the early 1990s drop in sale volumes during a strong market;
the change in owl survey protocols caused the precipitous drop in 1994
Recall again that stumpage purchasers are essentially working in the
futures market. Given that, they require a portfolio of potential harvest areas
under contract, which at times has been as substantial as three to four times
the annual sales as shown in Figure 4, supra. The strategy purchasers use is
based on the expectation that prices (nominal and real) for both stumpage
and timber product will rise in the future. Within any one contract is a time
constraint, and possibly environmental and physical access constraints as
well. Purchasers take these factors into account when making harvest
decisions; but the primary consideration is to cover costs (i.e., he price paid
for the stumpage plus harvest, transport and milling expenses) and make a
profit. Necessarily, companies will first harvest stumpage giving the highest
spread between the price paid at auction and the current market price for
stumpage. This strategy works well when prices are generally increasing,
whether real prices or nominal prices. This is because the contracts bought
today will be worth more in the future (albeit a premium may be paid due to
this expectation), and the contracts bought two years previously are now
worth quite a bit more. This situation is illustrated graphically in Figure 5.
The distance between the zero line and the top of the dark-shaded
column in Figure 5 represents the average real price difference between
timber harvested for a specific year and the average real price for stumpage
sold that year. Similarly, the distance between the light-shaded column and
the zero line represents the difference between the average real value of
stumpage under contract compared to the average real price of stumpage
sold that year. When the lines are above zero, constricts either harvested or
remaining in purchasers' portfolios obtain a speculative profit (realized or
potential) due to the futures nature of stumpage sales. And the fact that
purchasers typically harvest their least expensive contracts within their
aggregate portfolio is seen by the fact that the "Contract Premium" line is
almost always below the "Harvest Premium." This means that there are
greater profits realized from the units harvested than from the ones
remaining (which include a mixture of older and newer contracts).
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This strategic phenomenon has, in fact, been the pattern for most recent
periods in DNR sales, as can be seen in Figure 5. Specifically, it is the reason
that purchasers prefer to maintain large volumes under contract (as well as
having certainty of supply) that leads to the situation shown in Figure 2 where
these volumes are large relative to annual stumpage sales. Alternative
strategies, however, are called for when prices are expected to decline in the
future. In this case, the company would harvest its most expensive (assuming
costs could be covered) contracts first, essentially to limit exposure to future
price decreases, then subsequently harvest the less expensive contracts.
There would seem to be no question that the DNR, and the trust
beneficiaries, would be better off if the speculative nature of the timber sale
process could be reduced. It must be realized, however, that the DNR's even-flow
policy makes a major contribution to encouraging such behaviour on the part of
purchasers. The "Guss Report" identifies significant gains from pursuing a price-
responsive stumpage marketing strategy as opposed to an even-flow policy:
There seems to be considerable revenue potential if the
Department can reduce below mean sales, selling more timber at
times when higher prices can be commanded .... Timber sales
need not be withheld for long periods. Studies suggest that as
little as a two year range over what was planned on a sustained
yield basis would gain much of the available incremental revenue,
while plus or minus five years would gain substantially all.222
222. ld. at 70.
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Clearly, the decision was made subsequent to the Guss Report explicitly
riot to use a price-responsive marketing strategy. The 1992 Forest Resources
Plan makes it plain that the DNR is committed to a large even-flow regime, both
from the federal grant lands as well as from the Forest Board lands.
The decision to use an even-flow policy for the trust lands was subject to
considerable debate before, and after, the practice was adopted. The
Economics Panel in the 1977 review of DNR and Board policy12 noted
"concern about adoption of the 'even-flow' interpretation of sustained yield
management by the Department, principally because the Department
sustainable harvest model does not adequately incorporate economic
factors.."224 The Economics Panel went on to say "that it has seen no evidence
that sustained yield/even-flow leads to acceptable management of a forest as
a capital asset. '" 2 ' There were two points to this argument: first, even-flow
reduces near-term harvests during conversion of old growth to second growth;
and secondly, even-flow constrains response to market demands (both higher
and lower) for stumpage. Regarding the second point, the 1977 Department
Study Group's Timber Harvest Panel suggested that "DNR have 200-300
million board feet of timber prepared for sale in order to be able to respond
quickly to high market demand and accompanying higher prices; this implies
that the limits of annual fluctuation of harvest within a decade be widened. 226
Given the volatile timber market in the mid- to late-1970s (see Figure),
the Board (with Bert Cole as Commissioner and Chair) was requested at its
November 7, 1978 meeting to expand the limits of annual sale fluctuations to
plus or minus 50 percent, and for decadal sales to plus or minus 10 percent of
the decade's sustained yield harvest. 227 The Board generally agreed to allow
this. 28 DNR policies to reduce timber placed on the market during 1981
engendered a response from representatives of the Western Forest Industries
Association (WFIA) at the August 1981 Board meeting.229 The DNR proposed
reducing sales by 50 percent in the first half of the decade, then increasing
223. See 1992 POLICY PLAN, supra note 135 at Part A General Report.
224. Id. at 10. Note, however, in this context even-flow limited near-term harvest,
rather than pressured to maintain harvests at higher levels as in present context.
Nevertheless, on purely economic grounds even-flow has little to recommend it. Also, in the
1977 report, the Timber Panel recommend continuance of DNR's sustained yield/even-flow
policy even while the Economics Panel was recommending against it. Id. at 10, 14-15.
225. Id. at 11. "Even within the 'sustained yield requirement, the panel views the DNR
'even flow' as unnecessarily restrictive to effective management .I... "d. at 14.
226. Id. at 19.
227. See Board of Natural Resources, Minutes 48 (Nov. 7, 1978).
228. We were unable to confirm the final approval date of this action, although the
change was virtually assured at the above-mentioned Nov. 1978 Board meeting.
229. See Board of Natural Resources, Minutes 26 (Aug. 7, 1981).
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them 50 percent during the second half (this was called Strategy #1 in the
Department Staff Report to the Board).23 ° The representative for WFIA raised
concerns not only about the availability of funding for trust beneficiaries, but
also about effects on small, dependent firms and the number of future bidders
DNR sales.23 The 1983 FLMP established the present sustained-yield even-
flow timber sale constraints.232 These constraints are that annual sales be
within plus or minus 25 percent of the long-term sustained yield, and that the
decadal sustained yield amounts be harvested, or that according to statute,
the DNR must devise a plan to do so.
233
Ultimately, the question regarding the DNR's sustained yield even-flow
policy comes down to factors outside economic considerations. Clearly, from a
strictly financial standpoint, even-flow has a difficult challenge to overcome. Past
discussion in the Board, particularly during Brian Boyle's tenure as Commissioner
and Chair, tended to offset the financial losses from even-flow by justifying it
during poor market conditions to protect both the DNR's and the timber
industry's ability to effectively (and competitively) sell and purchase timber during
the good periods. Also related, but not easily determinable from the data, is
whether the DNR was in fact constrained by even-flow policies from offering
higher levels of sales during good market periods.
There is perhaps justification based on trust land origins for at least
some even-flow of timber during poor market conditions. If the purpose of
the Forest Board lands is to reforest land and provide a table supply of
timber to the locality, then, at least for the Forest Board lands, an even-flow,
rather than a revenue-maximizing or price-responsive, timber sale policy
could be justified.3 The Board, in fact, spent a lot of time during the 1980s
considering the effects of its sales levels on local communities and
230. See id.
231. See id. Note that this was the identical rationale for the contract buyouts
litigated in Skamania, supra note 97.
232. See Board of Natural Resources, Minutes 10 (Jan. 5, 1988).
Responding to Vandenberg's comment, Boyle said there was a conscious decision made by this
Board in the low period of the economy that they were going to keep a sales program going. In the
FLMP they decided that they were going to change the policy of varying the sales level by 50 percent,
plus or minus, and changed it to 25 percent, plus or minus. They realized and discussed with the
Board that there needed to be a certain level of sales policy in order to keep employment levels
going. He was not talking about employing people as a trust responsibility, but that they needed to
keep a bid pool going because the market would eventually tum around and that our people needed
to be equipped to sell timber and there needed to be a market for the timber at the time that the
market tumed around. It didn't make sense from a trust standpoint to stop the sales program.
Id.
233. See WASH. REV. CODE § 79.68.045. Enacted by Laws 1987, ch. 159, § 4, supra note 213.
234. See generally WASH. REv. CODE § 76.12.020.
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dependent industries, as well as on beneficiary requirements. There was
little concurrence among Board members on how to proceed. Some
members, -principally the Dean of College of Forest Resources, wanted to
continue to offer timber for sale even when it appeared very likely that the
bottom had fallen out of the market and many previous sales would be
defaulted.23' Others, including representatives of the Superintendent of
Public Instruction, wanted to scale back sales in order to preserve the trusts,
in this case the Common Schools' capital in the form of old growth.23
V. Conclusion
The GAO Report missed or muddied important similarities, such as the
even-flow sustained yield constraint and the timber sales contracts, between
state and federal management and also adequately explored major
differences between the two systems. It is not adequate to say that because
the goals are simpler, state planning is less controversial, or because the
state relies on receipts for funding, their management is going to be more
efficient. We have seen in the arrearage dispute that in the fundamental
intellectual structure of the timber program, the state's commitment to
sustained yield/even-flow is every bit as inefficient as the federal program.
And we have observed that the state's timber sale contracts allow the
purchaser all the speculative advantages of the market, with very clear
disadvantages to the trust.
But we have also seen that the states are able to sell more timber
more efficiently than the federal government. We attribute this not to an
absence of controversy but to mechanisms for containing it. By far the most
important is the constitutional status of the mandate-as long as there is a
235. See Board of Natural Resources, Minutes 26 (Aug. 4,198 1), supra note 209.
236. See id. at 24. See also Board of Natural Resources, Minutes 14 (Jan. 5, 1988).
IBill Daley, Administrative Assistant to Superintendent of Public Instruction, Frank Brouilletl
said ICommissioner Boyle knew very well that the major holdings of the school trust were
part of that last decade Iof salesl in a depressed market and much of it was old growth. We
were dealing here with the remnants of that. The original environmental plan was developed
by Boyle's predecessor and had been thoroughly consistently implemented over the last few
years. It had been a plan that cut all of that old growth at a time when we faced a baby boom
in the 1980s and 1990s. It also cut everything in a depressed market. We urged at that time
that not be done. We sought legislation to prevent it from being done, but it was done
anyway .... As matter of fact there was correspondence consistently to that effect in this
past year urging that the adoption of the policies related to old growth held in the common
school trust, we would approach the legislature for a different long-term solution to the way
to build schools in the short-term and save those resources for when we would need them
and when they were likely to be more valuable to us.
Id. at 14.
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beneficiary or other public spirited citizen to sue to enforce the trust, the
legislature is limited in the extent to which it can divert trust resources to
subsidize other public purposes. We have seen, however, that when there is
no litigant to challenge such patent nonsense as the state's timber sale and
even-flow policies, the trust is not vindicated. We have also observed the
importance of the notion of prudence in evaluating the trustee's decisions.
Although prudence appears, in many respects, to resemble the chaos
of discretion inherent in the multiple use standard, the resemblance does
not recreate on state lands the problems the GAO observed with federal
management. Although it is utter nonsense to assert that the trust lands are
uncontroversial, the Loomis and arrearage disputes demonstrate the
contrary quite emphatically, the expectations surrounding the lands are
much clearer. In the Loomis case, we see disagreement as to what the goal
means, but we do not see disagreement about the goal. And in the
arrearages case, we find that all the arguments are made in the context of
shared assumptions about the priorities. This culture of acceptance of the
mandate, and its underlying notion of prudence, seems to us to be the place
to start when trying to explain the differences in the outcomes between the
two ownerships.
